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THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS OF
HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM
Heather K. Gerken*
Ari Holtzblatt**
For decades, we have debated whether “political safeguards” preserve healthy
relations between the states and the federal government and thus reduce or
eliminate the need for judges to referee state–federal tussles. No one has made
such an argument about relations among the states, however, and the few
scholars to have considered the question insist that such safeguards don’t exist.
This Article takes the opposite view and lays down the intellectual foundations
for the political safeguards of horizontal federalism.
If you want to know what unites the burgeoning work on horizontal federalism and illuminates the hidden logic of its doctrine, you need know only one
fact: lawyers hate spillovers. Whether it is a state’s decision to license same-sex
marriage or set high emissions standards or maintain lax gun-ownership
rules, we worry when one state’s regulations affect residents in another state.
And just as most scholars aspire to prevent spillovers, most look to the courts to
fix the problem.
The current state of the law and literature makes clear why no one has
thought to develop a safeguards account of horizontal federalism to match the
one that dominates debates over vertical federalism. Why bother with political
safeguards if politics is the problem and the judiciary is the solution?
In this Article, we don’t just question the consensus against spillovers but offer
an affirmative account as to why much interstate conflict can or should be left
to the free play of politics. Our argument emphasizes the democratic possibilities associated with spillovers and looks to vertical federalism as a model for
thinking about how the states ought to interact with each other. Spillovers,
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after all, occur just as routinely between the state and federal government as
they do between the states. State–federal friction, however, is understood to be
both a problem and a valuable part of a well-functioning democracy. The
same should be true of horizontal federalism. Our goal should not be to suppress friction but to harness it—to shut down damaging spillovers while allowing productive ones to run their course.
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Introduction
For decades, we have debated whether “political safeguards” preserve
healthy relations between the states and the federal government and thus
reduce or eliminate the need for judges to referee state–federal tussles.1 No
one has made a similar argument about relations among the states, however.
To the contrary, the few scholars to have considered the question insist that
such safeguards don’t exist.2 This Article takes the opposite view and lays
down the intellectual foundations for the political safeguards of horizontal
federalism.
***
If you read the U.S. Reports, you’d probably miss that “Our Federalism”
depends on relations among the states just as it depends on relations between the states and the federal government.3 But while the vertical dimensions of federalism have generated countless paeans, courts and scholars
have neglected federalism’s horizontal dimensions.
We know how “Our (Vertical) Federalism” is supposed to work. Vertical
federalism is thought to promote choice, foster competition, facilitate participation, enable experimentation, and ward off the national Leviathan.4 That
1. The effort began, of course, with Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
Colum. L. Rev. 543, 558–59 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 951, 966–72 (2001); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism
and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 117–26 (2001); Scott Fruehwald,
The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate
Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal Federalism, 81 Denv. U. L. Rev. 289, 327–28, 331
(2003). Professor Metzger ever so briefly touches on the strengths and weaknesses of the argument when discussing congressional oversight of interstate conflict. See Gillian E. Metzger,
Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1506–07 (2007). But
what she characterizes as the safeguards argument is quite different from that contemplated
here, as is clear from her conclusion—that our current constitutional arrangements “strongly
counsel toward seeing judicially enforced interstate antidiscrimination requirements as subject
to congressional override.” Id. at 1507. The closest thing we could find to our account is a 1989
student note written about a set of guidelines promulgated by the National Association of
Attorneys General (“NAAG”). But the note, which is focused on the guidelines’ validity,
doesn’t argue in favor of the political safeguards of horizontal federalism, nor does it make the
affirmative case for spillovers. It does argue, however, that the NAAG guidelines are evidence
that informal cooperative agreements can spring up among the states and thereby obviate the
need for a federal referee. See Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal
Interstate Cooperation, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 842 (1989).
3. Even the phrase “Our Federalism,” coined in the early days of the Republic and used
by Justice Black, refers to relations between the states and the federal government. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
4. For summaries of these arguments, see, for example, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 457–59 (1991); David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 75–106 (1995); Akhil Reed
Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1229 (1994);
Baker & Young, supra note 2, at 109–10; Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 774–79
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account lends order and coherence to an otherwise motley range of doctrinal questions, from preemption cases to the Spending Clause, from the regulation of interstate commerce to commandeering.
The same can’t be said of “Our (Horizontal) Federalism.” Courts, of
course, routinely referee disputes between the states and their citizenries. But
judges approach these cases seriatim, without an overarching account of
how interstate relations are supposed to function.5
Until recently, the academy has been little different, with scholars confining their analyses to horizontal federalism’s doctrinal silos.6 But a handful
of scholars have started to develop a transsubstantive account of horizontal
federalism to match the one we routinely deploy for vertical federalism.7 The
literature is small, to be sure, especially when compared to its well-developed counterpart. But the work now shares a recognizable common core
(1995); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3–10 (1988); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 53–63 (2004); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating
the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1493–1511 (1987) (reviewing Raoul Berger,
Federalism: The Founders’ Design (1987)). For the case that we reel these arguments off
too easily, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 317 (1997).
5. E.g., Michael S. Greve, The Upside-Down Constitution 96 (2012); Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 493, 495 (2008); Fruehwald, supra note 2, at 326;
Metzger, supra note 2, at 1474.
6. Most of the work has focused on the usual suspects—the dormant Commerce
Clause, the Due Process Clause, and so forth. But we also see efforts to think about relations
among the states in other areas. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism:
States as Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 Hastings L.J. 1673 (2011) (immigration law);
Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 Cornell J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 267 (2009) (family law); Noah D. Hall, Toward A New Horizontal Federalism:
Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 405 (2006) (environmental law).
7. Two of the early movers on this front were Professor Metzger and Professor Erbsen,
and both of their accounts continue to dominate the field. See Erbsen, supra note 5; Metzger,
supra note 2. Erbsen has even taken the next step, deploying what he considers to be the
general mandates of horizontal federalism and applying them to one of the field’s doctrinal
silos. See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 Emory L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing how horizontal federalism principles might affect personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence). While Erbsen
and Metzger ignited this debate, one should acknowledge the early work of Professor Laycock,
who invoked the notion of territoriality in building an account of interstate relations that
transcended horizontal federalism’s doctrinal silos. One should also recognize the work of
Professor Resnik, who has focused on federalism’s horizontal and even its “diagonal” dimensions. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249 (1992); Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political
Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1929 (2008); Judith Resnik et al.,
Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of
Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 709 (2008); Judith Resnik, The Internationalism
of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 1105 (2008); Judith Resnik,
Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in
Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 Emory L.J. 31, 44 (2007) (noting that “[h]orizontal
federalism . . . is coming into view as a subject for the legal academy” and offering one of the
early contributions to the trend); Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism,
Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 Yale L.J. 1564, 1581 (2006).
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and has sorted itself into rough-and-ready intellectual camps. It is thus an
appropriate moment to assess where that literature stands while offering our
own take on where it should go next.
In our view, what’s missing from the literature is an account of the
political safeguards of horizontal federalism. And it’s missing for reasons
that go to the field’s core commitments. Conflict is a recurring feature of
both vertical and horizontal federalism. States intrude on each other’s policymaking turf just as often as the state and federal governments regulate at
cross-purposes. What divides the two fields is how we should respond to the
ineluctable fact of friction. State–federal friction has long been understood
to be both a problem and a valuable part of a well-functioning democracy.
Vertical federalism’s goal, then, has not been to eliminate friction but to
harness it, allowing productive state–federal contests to play themselves out.
Moreover, most vertical federalism scholars think that the political arena,
not the judiciary, is the right forum for these fights. Political institutions,
not the courts, represent the true “safeguards” of federalism. And by the
“safeguards” of federalism, we refer not to the unreflective notion that politics is meant to safeguard state autonomy but to the correct formulation of
the claim, which is that politics safeguards the type of state–federal relations
necessary for our democracy to thrive.8
Scholars of horizontal federalism are much less sanguine about interstate conflict, and most of them look to the judiciary to referee state-to-state
conflict. Congress, administrative agencies, political parties, networked interest groups—all are thought to safeguard vertical federalism. But even
though those same institutions are available to mediate conflict among the
states, there is no safeguards account to be found in horizontal federalism.
Developing a political-safeguards account for horizontal federalism,
then, involves both excavation and construction. First, we must dig into the
doctrine and scholarship in order to account for the puzzling differences
between the fields. Second, once we’ve examined (and debunked) the arguments that have prevented scholars from even thinking to develop a safeguards account, we must build it.
As to the first task, it isn’t hard to figure out why a safeguards account
hasn’t emerged in horizontal federalism. One idea unites the burgeoning
scholarship and illuminates the hidden logic of much of its doctrine: lawyers
hate spillovers. We’ve all absorbed the economists’ lesson—some state activities generate positive externalities. But when law professors and judges think
about spillovers, they typically focus on the ones that generate controversy—those that residents of the affected state view with dismay. For instance, when lax gun-ownership enforcement in Virginia increases the
number of firearms in New York, we worry. When Massachusetts marries
same-sex couples from states that don’t recognize those marriages, we
worry. When California’s emissions standards trump the emissions standards of other states, we worry. When the Texas school board’s efforts to
move its curriculum in a socially conservative direction change textbooks for
8. See infra text accompanying notes 21–24.
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many states, we worry. We worry, in short, that state-generated spillovers
cause interstate friction, generate inefficiencies, undermine the national
marketplace, violate the autonomy of other states, and threaten democracy
by preventing citizens of the affected state from choosing their own destinies.9 These worries so dominate the literature that we don’t even have a
name for the opposite but equally important notion—that some state policies should cross state lines. The debate over whether states should recognize
same-sex couples married in other states, for instance, centers on when it is
appropriate to give a state decision extraterritorial reach. But while there is a
substantial body of research devoted to spillovers, we lack a name for what
we term spillunders.10
Just as most scholars aspire to prevent spillovers, most look to the courts
to fix the problem. That impulse finds substantial support in the Supreme
Court’s doctrine. The Court, for instance, has relied on the Commerce
Clause and the Due Process Clause to strike down state laws that reach beyond state borders. Similarly, concerns about spillovers have influenced
some of the Court’s preemption decisions.
The current state of the law and literature makes clear why no one has
thought to develop a safeguards account to match the one that dominates
debates over vertical federalism. Why bother with the political safeguards if
politics is the problem and the judiciary is the solution? Because we lack a
descriptive and normative argument that interstate conflict serves productive
ends, there is no reason to think that spillovers can or should be left to the
free play of politics.
That leads us to the second task of this paper: building the descriptive
and normative argument currently missing from the literature. Our argument begins with a simple observation. The near-universal distaste for spillovers stands in sharp contrast to their near-universal presence in our
system. Spillovers are a permanent and inevitable feature of the American
regulatory landscape. This fact led us to wonder whether anything positive
can be said of spillovers. After all, if an affirmative case can be made for
spillovers, it should change the way we think and write about them.
None of this is to say that we have any quarrels with the well-known
litany of grievances against spillovers. Our goal is to complicate this account,
not engage in an intellectual cage match with our theory’s competitors. The
problem with the existing narrative isn’t that we’ve overestimated the costs
associated with spillovers; the problem is that we’ve underestimated their
benefits. That’s because spillovers generate friction, and friction has its uses
in a democratic system.
The claim that spillovers generate friction may not sound like a propitious start for an affirmative case. After all, lawyers are allergic to spillovers
9. The literature is, of course, more complicated than our aphorism suggests. It draws
on a rich and varied set of legal, economic, and democratic theories, and it illuminates a wide
range of problems arising from interstate relations. Nonetheless, the fact remains that most of
the scholarship—and much of the doctrine—is aimed at preventing spillovers.
10. See infra Section II.C.
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because they force people to live under another state’s rules, something that
can engender controversy and conflict. But the friction generated by spillovers isn’t all bad. Far from it. That’s because interstate friction spurs democratic engagement. Spillovers prevent citizens from nesting too comfortably
in their own policymaking enclaves, force political elites to engage with
those on the other side of an issue, and create the conditions under which
compromise and accommodation are possible, even necessary. Spillovers
force us all to live under someone else’s law, an underappreciated feature of
a well-functioning democracy and an essential practice in a well-functioning
union. Opponents of same-sex marriage, for instance, find themselves living
next to a gay couple married in another state. Residents of blue states have to
read the textbooks designed for a conservative Texas market. Skeptics of environmental reform find themselves driving cars that meet California’s high
emissions standards. As a result, political elites in these states are prodded to
reach across political boundaries, not just territorial ones.
Spillovers also give political entrepreneurs an opportunity to set the
agenda, teeing up a fight that will generate more advocates for change and
forcing reluctant state or national elites to engage. California’s environmental regulations, for instance, led the auto industry (which had been happy
with the status quo) to join environmentalists in demanding national regulation. The threat that Hawaii would legalize same-sex marriage prompted
the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”). Spillovers are one of
the best means of prodding politicians to do what they are supposed to do:
politic, find common ground, negotiate a compromise that no one likes but
everyone can live with. In the first half of the century, spillovers generated
by state commercial regulations led to the development of the Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”), which provided a focal point for the politicking
and compromise necessary to break the political logjams that had blocked
reform within the states. More recently, spillovers associated with air pollution spurred the development of a national solution. Spillovers, in short, can
help generate the democratic churn necessary for an ossified system to move
forward while enlisting citizens and elites in the project of pluralism.
If you believe, as we do, that there are good reasons to leave much interstate conflict to the free play of politics, two counterarguments immediately
spring to mind. Unsurprisingly, both dominate the literature on horizontal
federalism.
The first is a normative worry. Many believe that principles of territoriality, equality among the states, and democratic self-rule—typically grouped
under the larger rubric of “sovereignty”—require us to tamp down on spillovers. Sovereignty, however, is as elusive in the horizontal context as it is in
the vertical one. We are as linked to one another horizontally as we are
vertically. Regulatory overlap is the rule. And yet we cling to ideas in horizontal federalism that we discarded long ago in vertical federalism. Our account takes seriously the notions of territoriality and self-rule. But neither is
a normative trump card; they must instead be weighed against the normative goods associated with political and economic integration.
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The second counterargument is a pragmatic one. The political safeguards of horizontal federalism will fail, of course, if nonjudicial actors are
incapable of mediating the most damaging forms of interstate conflict.
Scholars of horizontal federalism often write as if this were the case, looking
all but exclusively to the courts to referee interstate disputes. Here again, we
side with the scholars of vertical federalism, who have long thought that
many institutions are as capable as—if not more capable than—the courts
in striking the right balance between conflict and cooperation. Congress,
administrative agencies, political parties, networked interests groups, and
NGOs can and do mediate interstate tussles. One might favor these safeguards of horizontal federalism not just because they are more nimble and
flexible than courts but because we won’t reap the democratic advantages
associated with spillovers if courts always play the role of über-referee. While
we do not offer a full-blown defense of this claim here, we suggest that our
system is reasonably well structured to harness democratically productive
forms of interstate friction while avoiding its more damaging varieties.
Given the democratic benefits associated with spillovers, it will often be better to resolve spillover fights through political rather than judicial institutions. And by “better” we mean to invoke not just an argument about
comparative institutional competence but also a broader normative claim
about how a healthy democratic system should function.
Note that our aims are quite ambitious on this point. It would be easy
enough to respond to worries about spillovers by pointing out that they are
the natural result of democratic and economic integration. While we make
that argument in Part IV, we don’t rest our entire case on it. The notion that
spillovers are symptoms of a well-functioning system, after all, would only
justify tolerating them (because the benefits of an integrated system would
outweigh the costs of eliminating spillovers). But this is an account of the
political safeguards of horizontal federalism. That, in our view, requires us to
place our faith in politics rather than merely resign ourselves to the role
politics plays. We thus hope to do what scholars of vertical federalism have
done: Show that we should not just tolerate conflict but celebrate it. Show
that spillovers aren’t just a symptom of democratic health but contribute to
it.11
Here’s where we are less ambitious. It took decades of debate, dozens of
academics, and thousands of pages to develop a fully satisfying account of
the political safeguards of vertical federalism. We are under no illusions that
one article can achieve the same feat in the context of horizontal federalism,
especially when much of what we say runs against the grain of the doctrine
and scholarship. We recognize that our claims are likely to be controversial,
and properly so. We recognize that we are likely to make mistakes and miss

11. While we focus on states here, a substantial amount of our discussion applies to
localities as well. As one of us has argued, substate, local, and sublocal institutions play an
integral role in “Our Federalism.” See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2010).
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arguments that work better than the ones we offer here. And we are painfully aware that a single article cannot possibly provide a fully satisfying
safeguards account, which means that a number of our arguments are radically incomplete. At bottom, this Article is designed to provoke—to begin a
conversation rather than to offer the final word.
***
Part I begins with an effort at excavation. It offers a brief overview of the
literature on vertical and horizontal federalism in order to show why a political-safeguards account has dominated the former but is entirely absent
from the latter.
Part II digs deeper, homing in on the core concern that has prevented us
from developing a safeguards account: a worry about spillovers and the conflict they generate. Hostility to spillovers is ubiquitous within the academy
and the judiciary, something that explains why no one has thought to argue
that interstate relations can and should be left to the free play of politics.
Having explained the academy’s failure to develop a safeguards account,
Part III begins to construct our affirmative case. It lays down the foundations of a safeguards argument by showing that, when kept within reasonable bounds, interstate friction plays a useful role in a well-functioning
democracy. Spillovers mitigate a core problem at the national level by teeing
up conflict and forcing issues on the agenda of reluctant national elites. And
spillovers mitigate a core problem at the state level by preventing both political elites and everyday citizens from sorting themselves into all-too-comfortable enclaves.
Once we recast spillovers in these terms, it becomes clear that our goal
should not be eliminating spillovers but managing them—preventing destructive interstate battles from occurring while allowing productive ones to
run their course. Here, we draw on the work depicting vertical federalism as
an institutional strategy for harnessing the productive frictions associated
with state–federal sparring while ensuring that the polity remains a polity.
Having established our core claim—that many spillovers can and should
be left for the political process to resolve—Parts IV and V respond to the
two main counterarguments. The first emphasizes the normative goods associated with state sovereignty, and the second goes to the wisdom of depending on political institutions to mediate interstate disputes. In each
instance, we suggest that the political safeguards of federalism are as robust
horizontally as they are vertically.
I. Horizontal v. Vertical Federalism: A Brief Overview
Before constructing our affirmative case, we’ll briefly situate horizontal
and vertical federalism within constitutional theory. Or, to be blunt, we’ll
tell you a tale of tales, describing two markedly different law stories and
explaining why the differences in their story lines matter. We do so for two
reasons. First, we hope to explain why vertical-federalism scholars have
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spent decades arguing over the political safeguards while their counterparts
in horizontal federalism have not even thought to develop a safeguards account. Second, we hope to identify precisely what’s needed to get such an
account up and running.
As noted above, when judges resolve the remarkably eclectic set of cases
implicating vertical federalism, they rely on a single, overarching account
about how the states and federal government ought to interact.12 We don’t
have a distinctive tale about “Our (Horizontal) Federalism” to tell around
the law-school campfire. But if you look closely enough, you can see the
narrative’s basic outlines and observe that its story line diverges substantially
from that of vertical federalism.
As with all great stories, conflict is a pervasive feature in both accounts,
with governments bumping up against one another as they regulate in the
same policymaking space. But we depict conflict quite differently in these
two arenas.
In vertical federalism, conflict performs the same role it plays in a
Shakespearean comedy. It can be the source of chaos and consternation, but
it ultimately gets worked out in the end, leaving us all the better for it. It is a
commonplace that we want to maintain a productive tension between the
states and federal government. While there have been endless battles over
how to maintain that productive tension, the goal has never been to rid
ourselves of state–federal friction. Instead, we’ve sought to harness it, taking
advantage of all the benefits friction offers while keeping it within reasonable bounds.
In horizontal federalism, the story of conflict is a tragedy in waiting—a
cautionary tale about norms upended and the looming threat of instability.
That tale centers on a single narrative: lawyers hate spillovers. And no wonder. There is something disquieting about one state’s citizenry regulating
another’s. Spillovers don’t just generate conflict but unsettle deeply held
normative commitments to sovereignty, territoriality, and self-rule. We thus
see something akin to a one-way ratchet in the literature, with almost every
argument focused on reducing spillovers and the conflict they engender.
The story lines of vertical and horizontal federalism diverge in a second,
equally important way. They differ as to how we should handle the conflict
that inevitably arises as governments regulate shoulder to shoulder in a tight
policymaking space. For decades scholars have looked to politics and process, not courts and sovereignty, to referee state–federal scuffles. In 1954,
Professor Wechsler famously argued that we should trust the “political safeguards of federalism” to resolve state–federal disputes.13 On Wechsler’s view,
the power that state authorities enjoyed over their federal counterparts
meant that Congress could be trusted to resolve state–federal conflict, with
the courts playing at most a subordinate role. While no one was entirely
satisfied by Wechsler’s account, it was built up over time. Professor Choper
12. See supra text accompanying note 4.
13. Wechsler, supra note 1.
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followed a few decades later with a book and article devoted to the subject,14
although his argument never achieved dominance within the field. During
the last two decades, however, scholars have breathed new life into the safeguards account, and the idea has carried the day. To be sure, a majority of
the Supreme Court stands ready to intervene on the states’ behalf. In the
academic world, however, only a handful of scholars insist that the courts
should play a substantial role in policing state–federal tussles.15 We are all
process federalists now.
Just as faith in a muscular form of judicial review has gone by the wayside, so, too, has the vernacular of sovereignty. Elsewhere, one of us has
argued that scholars remain haunted by sovereignty’s ghost—that the de
facto autonomy lauded by process federalists bears a strong resemblance to
the de jure sovereignty lauded by sovereigntists.16 Nonetheless, while the
Court still clings to the idea of sovereignty,17 the dominant view in the academy is that sovereignty is dead.18
The tale of horizontal federalism is different. There sovereignty lives,
and the political safeguards were never born. Almost everyone who writes in
the area looks to the courts, and the courts alone, to restore order among the
states, with a few scholars suggesting that Congress also has a role to play
(albeit in conjunction with the courts).19 With this heavy emphasis on courts
comes a heavy reliance on sovereignty—the idea that states should preside
over their own policymaking empires without interference from other states.
Sovereignty supplies the grammar of adjudication in horizontal federalism,20
offering just the type of neat, conceptual categories one needs to order interstate relations and police territorial transgressions.
If you are puzzling over how horizontal institutions could ever safeguard
state power, then you are missing something important about Wechsler’s account. A safeguards account isn’t aimed at safeguarding state power. It’s
14. Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A
Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (1980); Jesse H.
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review,
86 Yale L.J. 1552 (1977).
15. See, e.g., Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
Colum. L. Rev. 847, 851 (1979); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence
of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1459 (2001); Ilya Somin, Taking Dissenting by Deciding All the Way Down, 48 Tulsa L. Rev. 523, 532–33 (2013); John C. Yoo, Sounds
of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 27 (1998); John C. Yoo, The
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (1997).
16. Gerken, supra note 11, at 11–18.
17. As is evident from the Court’s most recent decisions, which even went so far as to
constitutionalize the principle of interstate equality. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612, 2622 (2013) (recognizing states’ “equal sovereignty”). The Court is joined by a handful
of scholars. See supra note 15 (collecting sources).
18. The tradition dates back at least to Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1950).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 217–220 (describing the work of Metzger); infra
text accompanying notes 221–223 (describing the work of Professor Rosen).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 50–52.
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aimed at safeguarding a well-functioning democracy.21 Wechsler and his
heirs have been quite explicit on this point,22 and rightly so. While federalism scholars’ ardent support of the states has sometimes led them to treat
state power as an end unto itself,23 that is a mistake. Federalism, properly
understood, is an account of why state power is a useful means to achieve a
well-functioning democracy.24 The political safeguards of vertical federalism,
then, are designed to preserve the right kind of relationship between the
states and federal government, not to create a one-way ratchet in favor of
state autonomy. So, too, the question can’t be whether the political safeguards of horizontal federalism increase state power. The question is whether
they preserve the right kind of relations among the states for them to play
their important role in maintaining a healthy democratic system.
Given how these two tales diverge, it is not hard to see why a politicalsafeguards account has dominated debates over vertical federalism but has
yet to emerge in the context of horizontal federalism. The basic tenets in the
field push against leaving interstate friction to the free play of politics and
push toward imposing an extensive system of judicial review. If you think
spillovers and the friction they generate are an unmitigated problem, for
instance, you want to stop them. Judicial review, of course, provides a level
of finality and certitude that the rough and chaotic realm of politics cannot.
Indeed, worries about finality may loom even larger in the context of horizontal federalism. When we trust the state and the federal government to
play the game of politics in the vertical realm, we at least have a sense of the
rules of the game since the federal government holds the nationalsupremacy trump card. But no state can lay claim to supremacy. Interstate
conflicts, then, seem more likely to descend into the governance equivalent
of the Wild West.25
Similarly, if you worry that spillovers intrude on state sovereignty, cross
territorial lines, and compromise important democratic values, you will certainly demand a referee for interstate disputes, and your ideal referee will be
a court. Judicial review is well suited to dealing with questions of sovereignty, drawing jurisdictional lines, and declaring a clear winner.
Political solutions, in contrast, tend to be muddy along all of these
dimensions. They often rest on compromise, which means both sides have
21. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 Yale
L.J. 1889, 1891 (2014).
22. Wechsler emphasized that federalism itself is “like other elements of government, a
means and not an end.” Wechsler, supra note 1, at 552. Professors Baker, Young, and Kramer,
all of whom took up Wechsler’s mantle decades later, say precisely the same thing. Baker &
Young, supra note 2, at 135 (“[W]e would be the first to concede that states’ rights have no
independent value; their worth derives entirely from their utility in enhancing the freedom
and welfare of individuals.”); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 223 (2000) (“Federalism must be understood as
a means rather than an end . . . .”).
23. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 1900.
24. See id. at 1893.
25. Many thanks to Justin Levitt for suggesting this point.
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to give something up no matter how principled their cause. And the solutions only unfold over time through a messy, iterative, and often nonlinear
process. That’s why democratic solutions to democratic problems are rarely
expressed in the grammar of sovereignty.
Finally, a bet on the political safeguards requires confidence that institutions other than courts—administrative agencies, Congress, NGOs, political
parties, interstate organizations—can mitigate interstate conflict. If judges
are the Obi-Wan Kenobi of horizontal federalism,26 there’s little point to a
safeguards account.
In sum, we cannot fashion an argument in favor of the political safeguards of horizontal federalism until we develop a different tale about stateto-state relations. That narrative must (1) recognize the democratic possibilities associated with interstate friction; (2) acknowledge that sovereignty
is no more to be had at the horizontal level than it is at the vertical level; and
(3) place some trust in the ability of nonjudicial institutions to mediate interstate conflict. These are the foundations of a safeguards argument. While
our focus is on the first claim, we also offer an initial take on the second and
third. In each instance, we discuss both the nascent literature on horizontal
federalism and the mature debate on vertical federalism, with an eye to
bringing the former closer to the latter.
II. The Case Against Spillovers
Worries about spillovers dominate the scholarship and case law on horizontal federalism.27 Scholars believe that state laws that generate spillovers
are an exception to Justice Brandeis’s famous aphorism about the value of
state laboratories of democracy: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country.”28 They seize on the often-ignored second half of his
paean to state-based experimentation. Many commentators point out that
26. See Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope (Lucasfilm & Twentieth Century Fox 1977)
(“Help me, Obi-Wan Kenobi. You’re my only hope.”).
27. The exception to the rule seems to be Rosen’s work on one subcategory of spillovers—the extraterritorial application of a state’s law to citizens in another state. See Mark D.
Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133 (2010) [hereinafter Rosen, State Powers]; see also Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94
Minn. L. Rev. 1051, 1105–08 (2010) [hereinafter Rosen, Exclusivity] (discussing the same
topic in the context of a large discussion on regulatory overlap). Rosen wasn’t attempting to
develop the type of affirmative account for spillovers that we offer here; he was making a
sensible but more modest point about the reality of regulatory overlap and its effect on citizens
in other states. Nonetheless, his status as an outlier is intriguing, and we discuss his work in
greater detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 221–223.
28. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See Erbsen, supra note 5, at 514 n.59; Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1353, 1355 (2006); Michael S. Greve, Laboratories of Democracy: Anatomy of a Metaphor, Am. Enterprise Inst. (Mar. 31, 2001), http://www.aei.org/outlook/politics-and-public-opinion/elections/laboratories-of-democracy/.
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spillovers do “pose risks to the rest of the country.”29 So while any “single
courageous State”30 is welcome to “serve as a laboratory . . . [to] try novel
and social experiments”31 and then to try to convince other States to follow
along, no State should be allowed to “shift[ ]cost[s] [onto] . . . out-of-state
interests, or, as the economists would have it, impose[ ] externalities on
others.”32
Academics and judges have thoroughly canvassed the threats that spillovers pose. These arguments are so familiar—and so commonsensical—
that we will sketch them only briefly. Our aim, after all, isn’t to disprove
these arguments but simply to show that they’re incomplete.
A. The Costs of Spillovers
Concerns about spillovers can be grouped roughly into two categories:
worries that spillovers undermine our economy and worries that they undermine our democracy.
1. Spillovers and the National Economy
One of the greatest costs associated with spillovers is their potential to
undermine the national marketplace. The traditional account begins with
the observation that one of “the Framers’ purpose[s] [in adopting the Constitution was] to prevent a State from retreating into the economic isolation
that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States
under the Articles of Confederation.”33 On this view, the Commerce Clause
was designed to eliminate “economic Balkanization.”34 It’s easy to see why
one might worry about economic spillovers. Competing or conflicting state
regulations undermine the national market by robbing the nation of “the
considerable benefits that flow from national regulatory uniformity and [by
exposing] an increasingly unified national (and international) commercial
market [to] the imposition of externalities by unfriendly state legislation.”35
29. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 28, at 1355.
30. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 28, at 1371.
33. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).
34. Id.
35. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 28, at 1356; see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes
Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (explaining that state workersafety legislation could not be “inconsistent with [a] federal scheme of establishing uniform
federal standards”); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335–36 (1989) (holding that application
of Connecticut statute impacting commercial activity only outside of the state violated the
Commerce Clause); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (opinion of White, J.)
(precluding application of Illinois statute to commerce taking place outside Illinois’s borders
due to its “direct restraint on interstate commerce”); Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28
Conn. L. Rev. 1095, 1096–97 (1996) (arguing that multijurisdictional regulation and competition in internet regulation is “haphazard and uncoordinated”).
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Businesses incur greater transaction costs from having to track and comply
with multiple regulatory regimes. While the mere lack of uniformity between jurisdictions poses risks, two features of spillovers make matters
worse. First, spillovers allow states to export some of the costs associated
with their regulations,36 which leads states to interfere more with free trade
than they would if they fully internalized the cost of that decision.37 Professor Greve may be the fiercest critic of what he terms interstate “exploitation.”38 He warns, for instance, that the tort system and conflicts rules
combine to license states to exploit the citizens of other states. “One cannot
unshackle the states without allowing them to exploit each other,” he insists,
and “[w]hatever values that monstrosity [of modern products-liability law]
may serve, state autonomy is not one of them.”39 Second, spillovers may
expose a single course of conduct to inconsistent commands40 that may be
difficult, expensive, or impossible to satisfy simultaneously.41
2. Spillovers and Democracy
Other scholars worry that spillovers threaten our democracy. Some fear
that they undermine national unity. Professor Zimmerman has offered the
most comprehensive social-science account of interstate conflict, devoting
an entire book to identifying the best means for promoting cooperative state
relations.42 Erbsen has offered the most detailed account of this concern on
the law side, going so far as to catalogue eight sources of “constitutionally
significant interstate friction.”43 Nor are these scholars alone. The worry that
the friction generated by spillovers can threaten national unity has become
something of a trope in the literature.44 In the worst case, the worry is that
36. See Burk, supra note 35, at 1128–30; E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 313, 329–30
(1985); Erbsen, supra note 5, at 523–24; Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 28, at 1422–23.
37. Jack L. Goldsmith & Allan O. Sykes, Essay, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 Yale L.J. 785, 795–96 (2001).
38. Michael S. Greve, Federalism’s Frontier, 7 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 93, 95 (2002).
39. Id. at 106–07.
40. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (discussing recent
Commerce Clause cases where the Court “invalidated statutes that may adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations” (citation omitted)); see also
Donald H. Regan, Essay, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 Mich. L. Rev.
1865, 1875 (1987).
41. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 (1987) (discussing how application of
state law outside the state would “undermine the important goals of efficiency and predictability”); see also Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 37, at 786.
42. Joseph F. Zimmerman, Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Relations (2011).
43. Erbsen, supra note 5, at 510.
44. See Ann O’M. Bowman, Horizontal Federalism: Exploring Interstate Interactions, 14 J.
Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 535, 536 (2004) (the aim of horizontal federalism is minimizing
conflict); Erbsen, supra note 5, at 502–03 (“[F]riction can flare out of control if left unchecked
. . . undermin[ing] national stability.”); Fruehwald, supra note 2, at 329; Metzger, supra note 2,
at 1478 (“national umpire over interstate relations is essential to ensure union”); Garrick B.
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interstate tension will lead to violent confrontation, whether on a mass scale,
as with the Civil War, or on a more limited basis, as with armed border
skirmishes.45
Even tensions that do not escalate to violence are thought to be problematic. Some commentators, like Erbsen, worry that such tensions might
encourage citizens to identify more with their state or region than with the
nation and thus generate “entrenched regionally-defined factions that would
undermine national stability” over time.46 Others worry about maintaining
interstate relations.47 Metzger, for instance, argues that unchecked policymaking spillovers in “contexts of sharp public contestation” can threaten
“interstate harmony.”48 She writes, for instance, that “states’ fears that they
would be forced to recognize same-sex marriages absent DOMA . . . could
have led to interstate strife.”49 Spillovers, then, bring to the fore all the worries about the centrifugal effects of federalism.
A number of scholars worry that spillovers violate a different set of
democratic values: those having to do with state sovereignty.50 As we detail
in Part IV, sovereignty is a stand-in for a larger set of concerns about state
autonomy, equality among the states, territoriality, and self-rule. These principles amount to something of a mantra in the horizontal federalism literature and are regularly invoked, separately and together, in much of the work
on the subject even by those who don’t use the term sovereignty.51 We see a
Pursley, Defeasible Federalism, 63 Ala. L. Rev. 801, 818–20 (2012) (discussing the role that the
judiciary plays in ameliorating state friction at the horizontal level); Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 Geo. L.J. 497, 518, 526–28 (2012) [hereinafter Pursley, Dormancy] (expressing
worries about horizontal friction).
45. Erbsen notes the Framers’ worries about “frequent and violent contests” that undermine “peace” and “stability.” Erbsen, supra note 5, at 511–12 (quoting The Federalist No. 6,
at 54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
46. Id. at 522–23.
47. E.g., Fruehwald, supra note 2, at 329; Laycock, supra note 7, at 263–64.
48. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1503. Metzger concludes that Congress is constitutionally
empowered to address these problems. Id.
49. Id. at 1533; see also Fruehwald, supra note 2, at 329 (discussing the past and present
concern that “interstate rivalry” be curtailed).
50. See, e.g., Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territoriality, State Power: Reflections on
the Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1057,
1115 (2009); Scott Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels: The New Judicial Activism in Theory and
Practice, 83 Marq. L. Rev. 435, 492 (1999) (“Ignoring . . . general notions of horizontal federalism creates the danger that a state will exceed its sovereignty . . . .”); Metzger, supra note 2, at
1513. Rosen is an exception. He argues that we have moved from a system where states regulated exclusively within their jurisdiction to one where states regulate “concurrently.” Rosen,
Exclusivity, supra note 27, at 1105–08.
51. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 44 (discussing sovereignty and equality); Erbsen, supra
note 5, at 507–10, 514–16, 527–28 (discussing all four concerns); Florey, supra note 50 (offering a comprehensive take on extraterritoriality); Patrick M. Garry et al., Raising the Question of
Whether Out-of-State Political Contributions May Affect a Small State’s Political Autonomy: A
Case Study of the South Dakota Voter Referendum on Abortion, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 35, 40 (2010)
(“[H]orizontal federalism reflects the view that each state must have a sufficient degree of
independence and autonomy for other states.”); Michael S. Greve, Choice and the Constitution,
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similar tendency within the doctrinal silos that fall within the ambit of horizontal federalism.52 Spillovers impinge on state sovereignty by depriving a
state of full control over its territorial domain.
These arguments also tap into a deeply intuitive concern about territoriality and self-rule. We worry about spillovers because they prevent citizens
within a state from exercising control over their own destinies. In essence,
spillovers allow the representatives of one state’s citizens to tell another’s
what to do.53
B. The Doctrine
1. The Supreme Court’s Constitutional Cases
Just as worries about spillovers have dominated the scholarship on horizontal federalism, they have informed much of its doctrine as well.54 As with
the academic literature, the inner logic of the Court’s doctrine is premised
on a concern about spillovers.

Am. Enterprise Inst. (Mar. 1, 2003), http://www.aei.org/outlook/politics-and-public-opinion/judicial/choice-and-the-constitution/ (describing the fundamental principles guiding horizontal federalism: state equality, democratic self-rule, and “a presumption that state
sovereignty must end at the borders”); David V. Snyder, Molecular Federalism and the Structures of Private Lawmaking, 14 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 419, 432 (2007) (arguing that
spillovers “[i]n democratic terms . . . reflect[ ] a lack of representation”); see also sources cited
infra Section IV.A.
52. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, The Limits of Sovereignty and the Issue of Multiple
Punitive Damages Awards, 78 Or. L. Rev. 275, 292–99 (1999) (calling for sovereignty-based,
territorial limitations on punitive-damages awards); Greve, supra note 38, at 96–100 (arguing
that horizontal federalism’s tenets include “principles of state autonomy and equality,” which
require that “each state govern its own territory and citizens but not, of course, the territory
and citizens of other states”); Laycock, supra note 7, at 250–53, 315–21 (arguing that states are
not sovereign in the sense that countries are sovereign but relying on notions of state equality
and territoriality to define a state’s “semi-sovereign” status to understand choice-of-law issues); Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Full Faith and Credit, 20 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 485 (2013) (offering a historical account of the Full Faith and Credit Clause that would
place “territorial-based” limits on the ability of Congress to give a state’s law extraterritorial
effect); A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1085, 1093 (2006) (“[T]he sovereign authority of states
does not properly extend to the punishment of lawful extraterritorial activity within the federal system.”); see also sources cited infra Section IV.A.
53. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003); Int’l Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495 (1987); Cordray, supra note 52, at 308 (expressing concern
when a state “projects its own regulatory choices . . . onto other states” and thereby “infring[es] on the policy choices of other States” (quoting BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572
(1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Florey, supra note 50, at 1115 (one of the “ideological principles of federalism” is that “states are entitled to some autonomous sphere in
which to make policy free of interference from other sovereigns”).
54. A partial exception can be found in the case law arising under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, which is not surprising given the clause’s text and purpose. See infra text accompanying notes 256–266.
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a. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Court has expressed its concern about spillovers most explicitly in
its dormant Commerce Clause cases. The Court has focused much of its
efforts on state laws that regulate extraterritorial conduct. Edgar v. MITE
Corp. articulates the modern test. There, the Court struck down an Illinois
antitakeover law that protected any corporation with certain kinds of ties to
Illinois.55 The Court found that the law had “a sweeping extraterritorial effect” and that, if other states also imposed such regulations, “interstate commerce in securities transactions generated by tender offers would be
thoroughly stifled.”56 The Court then articulated an extremely broad rule:
“The Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or
not the commerce has effects within the State.”57 This rule was justified because “any attempt ‘directly’ to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of
the State’s power.”58
The Court elaborated on this rule in a series of price-affirmation cases,
where the Court expressed deep misgivings about regulations whose “practical effect . . . is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”59 The
Court based its broad ruling on “the Constitution’s special concern both
with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by stateimposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the
individual States within their respective spheres.”60
Related to the Court’s rule against extraterritoriality, the Court has also
“invalidated statutes [under the Commerce Clause] that may adversely affect
interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations.”61
The Court first articulated this principle in CTS Corp., a successor case to
MITE Corp.62
55. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982).
56. Id. at 642.
57. Id. at 642–43 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 643 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)).
59. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (emphasis added). Healy v. Beer Institute
struck down a statute that “t[ied] Connecticut beer prices to the prices charged in border
States” based in part on the way that “the challenged statute . . . interact[ed] with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or
every, State adopted similar legislation.” Id. at 326, 336. A statute failing this “practical effect[s]” test would be “invalid regardless of whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was
intended by the legislature.” Id. at 336.
60. Id. at 335–36 (footnote omitted).
61. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987); see also Healy, 491 U.S.
at 336–37 (“[T]he Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the
projection of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State.”).
62. In CTS Corp., the Court upheld a more narrowly drawn Indiana antitakeover statute
that applied only to corporations incorporated under Indiana state law. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at
94. Critical to the Court was the fact that, “[s]o long as each State regulates voting rights only
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The final line of dormant Commerce Clause cases dealing with spillovers arises under the Pike test, which applies to nondiscriminatory state
regulations whose “effects on interstate commerce are only incidental.”63
Under this test, which balances burdens on interstate commerce against “local benefits,”64 the Court considers whether local aims “could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”65 Spillover concerns appear prominently in these cases.66
b. The Due Process Clause
The Court has also tried to contain spillovers under the Due Process
Clause. BMW v. Gore struck down a large punitive-damages award based on
evidence of conduct that was tortious in the forum state but lawful in the
states where the conduct occurred.67 Relying on “principles of state sovereignty and comity,” the Court explained that “a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the
tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”68 This rule follows from the
principle that “one State’s power to impose burdens on the interstate market
. . . is not only subordinate to the federal power over interstate commerce,
but is also constrained by the need to respect the interests of other States.”69
So, too, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell struck
down a large punitive-damages award that was based in part on evidence of
out-of-state misconduct.70 As Justice Kennedy explained, “a State [does not]
have a legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State’s jurisdiction” because
to do so would prevent “each State [from] mak[ing] its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its borders.”71
Scholars have tried to push the Court in a similar direction for conflicts
cases, which are also rooted in due process. Although these cases plainly
in the corporations it has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one
State.” Id. at 89.
63. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. A good example is Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., where a plurality of the
Court applied the Pike test to an Iowa law that “generally prohibit[ed] the use of 65-foot
doubles [semitrucks on highways] within its borders.” 450 U.S. 662, 665 (1981) (plurality
opinion). The impact of Iowa’s rule would have been quite significant since major interstate
highways ran through Iowa. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 665. Besides fearing that Iowa’s law would
burden the interstate trucking industry, the Court was concerned that the law would have
imposed substantial costs on Iowa’s neighbors by increasing their truck traffic and/or overriding those neighbors’ policy choice to allow longer trucks. Id. at 671, 674–76.
67. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571–74 (1996).
68. Id. at 572.
69. Id. at 571 (citation omitted).
70. 538 U.S. 408, 418–21 (2003).
71. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421–22.
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implicate horizontal federalism and state sovereignty72—indeed, they were
once explicitly linked to such concerns73—the Court has recast them in the
language of individual rights.74 While most commentators think of this doctrinal shift as proof of the shortcomings of the sovereignty model,75 some
have urged the Court to return personal jurisdiction and choice of law to
their territorial and sovereignty-based roots because of the same spillover
worries that dominate the analysis of horizontal federalism’s other doctrinal
silos.76
2. The Supreme Court’s Statutory Cases
Concern about spillovers has also influenced the Court’s statutory preemption cases. In Ouellette, the Court held that the Clean Water Act implicitly preempted a Vermont plaintiff’s nuisance claim against a New York
72. Even setting aside the most obvious vestiges of a sovereignty approach, e.g., Burnham
v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion), worries about spillovers, sovereignty, and horizontal relations often implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) inform the Court’s
assessment of what process is owed a citizen who is subject to the jurisdiction or laws of
another state. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). For detailed analyses and vigorous critiques of this aspect
of the Court’s jurisprudence, see, for example, Robert H. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward a
Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 75
(1984); Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 Creighton L. Rev. 1245 (2011); Daan Braveman, Interstate Federalism
and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 Syracuse L. Rev. 533 (1982); John N. Drobak, The Federalism
Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 1015, 1050 (1983); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A
Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 Vand. L.
Rev. 1 (1984); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse of
Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 699 (1983);
Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation,
75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112, 1113–14, 1117–20 (1981).
73. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
74. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
75. See supra note 72.
76. For an overview of some of this work and one of the most recent contributions to it,
see Florey, supra note 50. See also Erbsen, supra note 5; Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due
Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1
(2006); Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 12–13); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Revised Analysis, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 617 (2006); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689 (1987); Margaret G.
Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 5 (1989); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 Wash. U. L.Q. 377 (1985). For signs
that at least some of the justices are likely to be sympathetic to such an approach, see an
opinion recently penned by Justice Kennedy, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780, 2789 (2011). For a vigorous rejection of efforts to return personal jurisdiction to its
federalism and sovereignty roots, see sources cited infra in note 72. For an effort to find a
middle ground, see John T. Parry, Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities of Sovereignty—Some
Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 827, 852–60
(2012).
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polluter that had discharged pollutants into Lake Champlain.77 Notably, the
Court found that the Act allowed the suit to proceed under New York nuisance law but not under Vermont law.78 Allowing a nuisance suit to proceed
under Vermont law “could effectively override . . . the policy choices made
by [New York].”79 And this would empower “Vermont and other States [to]
do indirectly what they could not do directly—regulate the conduct of outof-state sources.”80 The Court feared that this “chaotic regulatory structure”
would subject polluters to multiple, inconsistent regulations.81
Worries about inconsistent regulation of the same conduct also inform
cases like CTS Corp.82 The Court has broadened this rationale in more recent
cases in order to protect corporations from having to comply with what has
sometimes been characterized as a “crazy-quilt”83 of requirements set by fifty
different states. Critics of spillovers have convincingly argued that this preference for uniformity relates to spillovers as well. Consider Professor Issacharoff and Professor Sharkey’s analysis:
[M]ost products are mass produced and mass distributed, without any
clear sense of where in the national market they might end up . . . . The
upshot is that most manufacturers design and market uniform products
rather than different products for each state and, correspondingly, design
their products to the specifications of the largest states or to the jurisdiction with the most stringent liability standards . . . .84

The Court relied on just this uniformity rationale in Gade v. National Solid
Wastes Management Association.85 Invoking concerns about both horizontal
and vertical uniformity, the Court read the Occupational Safety and Health
Act to require that states obtain approval from the Secretary of Labor before
adopting workplace safety standards that were more stringent than the federal floor.86 Uniformity concerns have also animated several recent Court
opinions on the preemption of state tort suits.87
77. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987).
78. Id. at 497.
79. Id. at 495.
80. Id. According to the Court, the Clean Water Act permits states to set stricter discharge standards than required by federal law, but it reserves that power only to the source
state. Id. at 499.
81. Id. at 497.
82. See Regan, supra note 40, at 1880 (discussing how at least some of the justices were
concerned about “inconsistent regulations”).
83. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 448 (2005) (rejecting the defendants
and federal government’s argument that the regulations represented a “crazy-quilt” of
requirements).
84. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 28, at 1385–86.
85. 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
86. Gade, 505 U.S. at 108.
87. For example, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court speculated that Congress meant
for the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s express preemption clause to prohibit tort
suits against certain medical-device manufacturers out of “solicitude for those who would
suffer without new medical devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 States to
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C. Spillunders
Worries about spillovers are so dominant in law that we don’t even have
a term—let alone a full-fledged literature—on the opposite but equally important problem of what we term spillunders. If you care about state power,
after all, you should worry not just about states’ shielding their residents
from other states’ laws (spillovers) but also about state laws’ being denied an
appropriate extraterritorial reach (spillunders).
Think for a moment about same-sex marriage. The conventional worry
in horizontal federalism, with its focus on territoriality and sovereignty, is
that states that favor marriage equality will impose that preference on states
that don’t. But it might be just as important to a state to have the same-sex
marriages it has blessed recognized outside of its territory. Similarly, as we
describe below,88 the evolution of the Court’s personal-jurisdiction doctrine
has as much to do with spillunders as spillovers. The Court’s early cases were
preoccupied with territorial boundaries and the threat spillovers posed to
state power. That approach resulted in an underenforcement problem, making it difficult for a state to enforce its own laws against out-of-state citizens
who committed harms while passing through the state or against out-ofstate companies doing business in the state. And a whole book could be
written about the problem of spillunders with regard to the evasion of familial responsibilities, such as the failure to pay child support.89
These issues are well-known and make clear that horizontal federalism
depends as much on how we deal with spillovers as spillunders. And yet only
one of these problems has a name, let alone an academic pedigree.
***
Spillovers, in sum, have no fans in the judiciary or the academy. Judges
put a stop to a number of them, with scholars making the case for them to
do more.
III. The Affirmative Case for Spillovers
The scholarly and judicial hostility toward spillovers is interesting both
as a descriptive and prescriptive matter. As a purely descriptive matter, if you
all innovations.” 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008) (emphasis added). Similarly, Justice Thomas, dissenting for four justices in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, argued that the express preemption
clause of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act should preempt smokers’ state
fraud claim regarding the marketing of light and low-tar cigarettes because “whether marketing a light cigarette is ‘misrepresentative’ . . . would almost certainly be answered differently
from State to State . . . [which] will inevitably result in the nonuniform imposition of liability.” 129 S. Ct. 538, 561 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 553 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 248–253.
89. See Estin, supra note 6, at 302 (discussing horizontal federalism in the context of
child-support disputes); infra notes 235, 255 and accompanying text.
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worry about spillovers, there’s a lot to worry about.90 Spillovers are an absolutely routine phenomenon in a partially decentralized, highly integrated
system like our own. They occur when California passes climate-change legislation and car manufacturers in other states are forced to manufacture cars
that emit fewer greenhouse gases in order to sell in the California market.91
Or when New York courts must decide whether a same-sex couple married
in Massachusetts but now living in New York is legally married under New
York state law.92 Or when Texas adopts a statewide curriculum that questions
evolution and school boards around the country must decide whether to
buy textbooks tailored to one of the nation’s largest single textbook purchasers.93 Or when Vermont requires in-state retailers to disclose the use of
human-growth hormone and milk producers nationwide must decide
whether to change their farming practices lest they scare off an entire state’s
consumers.94 Or when Wisconsin refuses to contract with businesses that
have violated federal labor law anywhere in the country and companies that
hope to compete for Wisconsin’s contracts must change their practices elsewhere.95 Or when New York City sues Georgia gun dealers under New York
state tort law and out-of-state dealers must adapt their sales practices to
avoid liability.96 The list goes on and on.
The very effort to define spillovers makes clear how ubiquitous they are.
Spillovers are to law professors as pornography is to judges: we know it
when we see it.97 Most scholars don’t even bother to define what a spillover
is, and it’s hard to find a theoretically durable and intellectually satisfying
definition anywhere in the literature.98
90. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1521 (“In practice, states exert regulatory control over each
other all the time.”). Scholars of horizontal federalism routinely mourn this fact. See, e.g.,
Erbsen, supra note 5, at 496–97; Fruehwald, supra note 2, at 327–31.
91. E.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1155–57
(E.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d on reh’g, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Green Mountain
Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300–03 (D. Vt. 2007).
92. E.g., Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 328, 337 (N.Y. 2009) (Ciparick, J., concurring);
see also Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741–42 (App. Div. 2008) (dealing
with a similar problem when the other jurisdiction is not a U.S. state but a Canadian
province).
93. See Diane Ravitch, The Language Police 71–72, 98–107 (2003).
94. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69–70 (2d Cir. 1996).
95. Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 283–85
(1986).
96. New York City, concerned that lax enforcement outside of New York was creating a
market in which illegal guns were flooding the city, conducted a sting operation in Georgia
and elsewhere and then filed suit against gun dealers in those states. See Amended Complaint,
City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc. (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2007) (No. 06 CV 2233), 2007
WL 2739888.
97. With apologies to Justice Stewart. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
98. It’s even difficult to define them ex ante. Consider the debate over the role that
immigrants play in local economies. When Arizona’s anti-immigrant polices drive them to
other states, is it helping or hurting those states? One state’s unwelcome spillover is another’s
positive externality.
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There’s a reason for that. Almost any state activity causes spillovers. Economic spillovers are, of course, the favorite target of academics, and with
good reason. But they are very hard to define rigorously. After all, if a farmer
growing wheat for personal consumption can affect the national economy,99
then surely economic regulations passed by one state can affect its
neighbors.
If you move from the realm of economics to politics, the lesson still
holds. When a state regulates workplace safety or legalizes casinos or marries
same-sex couples or fails to regulate air pollution, those policies affect people out of state. Even when state policies are confined within a state’s borders, they can generate what one might call “psychic” or “cultural” or
“political” spillovers because people worry that those policies will influence
the national debate. Think about recent fights over same-sex marriage or
public unions or immigration laws. When a state moves on these fronts,
outside money often pours into the legislative fights. It’s not because people
elsewhere think that those regulations will have an immediate effect on their
own lives. It’s because they fear that these efforts will eventually lead to the
imposition of a national policy. At the very least, they worry that the mere
existence of the policy in some part of the country is inconsistent with their
understanding of national identity.100
Precisely because spillovers are ubiquitous in our tightly networked economic and political system, scholars who write about spillovers don’t try to
draw clean distinctions between state policies that affect out-of-state residents and those that do not. One might be tempted to confine one’s definition of spillovers to out-of-state effects that carry the force of one state’s law
(such as when same-sex couples married in one state move to another or
when one state’s tort law is applied to citizens of another state). But this
definition would fail to capture many phenomena routinely termed “spillovers” in the literature, many of which stem from the absence of regulation
(e.g., the way Georgia’s failure to regulate guns affects New York City’s efforts to limit them, or the way Ohio’s failure to regulate air emissions affects
residents of West Virginia). Rather than look to formal categories, law
professors make the problem manageable by imbuing the term with some
normative weight, focusing on state policies that are both unwelcome to residents of other states101 and have enough of an extraterritorial effect for us
to notice them.102 We know it when we see it.
99. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
100. Thanks to Jonathan Meltzer and Ted Ruger for suggesting this point. Professor Cunningham-Parmeter’s work on state-level immigration policies provides a good example of how
many types of spillovers occur even within a single domain. He argues that immigration policies inflict economic and policy spillovers on other states as well as shape our “shared national
identity.” See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 6, at 1714–23.
101. Law professors have learned the economists’ lesson that state activities can generate
positive externalities for other states, which is precisely why they focus on unwelcome effects.
See supra text accompanying notes 9–10. Otherwise, everything would be a spillover.
102. Note the irony here. Politics, of course, is often what tells us when a cross-state effect
is sufficiently important and undesirable to constitute a “spillover,” and yet those who use this
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Even setting aside the descriptive observation—that spillovers are ubiquitous—scholarly hostility to spillovers is interesting as a prescriptive matter
because it stands in stark contrast to the core commitments of vertical federalism. Spillovers occur just as routinely in vertical federalism as they do in
horizontal federalism. Indeed, most federalism cases amount to turf wars
between the states and the federal government, each seeking to regulate
where the other thinks its policies ought to prevail.
But while horizontal federalism deplores the friction that spillovers generate, vertical federalism celebrates it. It’s not just that academics tolerate
state–federal tussles because they are the natural consequence of an integrated national system. Instead, scholars often laud friction as an essential
part of a well-functioning democracy. No one favors all forms of friction at
all costs. But many people do believe that some conflict between the state
and federal governments is healthy. The goal in vertical federalism, then, is
not to suppress friction but to harness it.103 In horizontal federalism, in
sharp contrast, worries about the interstate frictions run so deep that some
even think that preventing friction is part of the very definition of horizontal
federalism.104
You might dismiss the comparison on the ground that we value state–
federal friction for reasons that are irrelevant to relations among the states.
We celebrate state resistance at the vertical level because it wards off a national Leviathan and checks an overweening federal government.
Fair enough. Keeping the federal government within its bounds is surely
the main reason we value state–federal friction. But there are others, all of
which have to do with maintaining a healthy democracy and creating democratic spaces where the minority and majority can interact. States are important in a federal scheme because they can “dissent by deciding”—state
policymakers can challenge national policy not by writing an editorial or
organizing a march (the tools conventionally deployed by dissenters) but by
offering a real-life instantiation of an idea.105 State power exercises a gravitational pull on racial minorities and dissenters, pulling them into the project
of governance and giving them a stake in its success.106 States are sites where

flexible definition tend to denigrate the role that politics plays in horizontal federalism. Thanks
to Bryn Williams for suggesting this point.
103. Another way to characterize the two fields is that they draw different lines between
tolerable and intolerable friction or depend on different assumptions about what kind of friction is acceptable. We think the basic point here still holds if the problem is reframed in this
fashion, but we are grateful to Allan Erbsen for suggesting the idea.
104. Erbsen, for instance, argues that horizontal federalism should be understood as a “set
of constitutional mechanisms for preventing or mitigating interstate friction that may arise
from the out-of-state effects of in-state decisions.” Erbsen, supra note 5, at 503.
105. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745 (2005).
106. See Gerken, supra note 11, at 44–71.
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the opposing party can coalesce into what Young depicts as shadow governments,107 where political parties can wage their battles,108 where local officials
can monitor federal officials and train the loyal opposition,109 and where
dissenters can model policymaking alternatives to the dominant national
view.110 States can help us work through divisive issues, “keep[ing] open the
capacity for change, so that law and policy can reflect and channel the variable rather than linear nature of public morality on most questions.”111 When
states clash with the federal government, they ensure that conventional wisdoms are challenged and policies are justified.112 State contestation also plays
a particularly important role in generating the democratic churn necessary
to ensure that national policymaking doesn’t ossify.113 For all of these reasons, the work on vertical federalism is aimed at maintaining a healthy level
of state–federal friction while ensuring that the polity remains a polity.
The same cannot be said for the work on horizontal federalism. The
ubiquitous goal is to suppress friction, not celebrate it. And given that scholars view friction as a bug rather than a feature of “Our (Horizontal) Federalism,” their prescriptive arguments all but write themselves.
As a result, we see the theoretical equivalent of a one-way ratchet—lots
of arguments for doing more to suppress friction but almost no arguments
for letting interstate conflicts run their course. To be sure, some scholars are
willing to tolerate low-level friction.114 But that tolerance is begrudging, premised not on the idea that interstate friction can be useful but on the notion
that some forms are too costly to suppress. If courts and scholars could limit
107. See Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the
Wake of the War on Terror, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 1277, 1285–87 (2004); see also Merritt, supra
note 4, at 7.
108. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1077
(2014) (arguing that states check the federal government by channeling partisan conflict
through federalism’s institutional framework).
109. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.
483, 503–05 (1991); Baker & Young, supra note 2, at 137–38.
110. See Young, supra note 107, at 1285–87.
111. Cristina Rodrı́guez, Federalism and National Consensus 62 (Oct. 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/RodriguezFederalismandNationalConsensus10.14.pdf.
112. See generally Amar, supra note 109, at 499–504 (summarizing three ways in which
federalism checks the federal government).
113. See Gerken, supra note 11, at 60–71.
114. Greve, for instance, insists that “[a]ny federal system has to live with . . . regulatory
spillovers” even while acknowledging that such a system can “control excessive spillovers.”
Greve, supra note 5, at 307. Similarly, Erbsen briefly suggests that “[f]riction-inducing behavior can be tolerable, or even desirable,” because some forms of friction are too “minor” to
bother with or because “diversity between state regulatory approaches is an inevitable consequence of federalism” or because “antagonizing some states by discriminating against their
interests can—if done under federal supervision—avoid even greater friction.” Erbsen, supra
note 5, at 513–14. So, too, Metzger believes that interstate discrimination may be appropriate
when one state is resisting the spillovers associated with another’s policy—in other words,
engaging in self-help—although even here her core goal is to prevent spillovers. Metzger, supra
note 2, at 1479, 1501.
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every state policy to its own territorial limits, we suspect most would do so
in a heartbeat.
It’s possible that no one has bothered to develop such an account because interstate friction has no role to play in a healthy democratic system.
We take the opposite view. Our case rests on more than the claim that interstate friction is a symptom of a healthy democracy rather than a disease unto
itself. While we make that argument in Part III, our aims are more ambitious. We hope to show that interstate friction can play a roughly comparable role to that played by state–federal friction in promoting our nation’s
democratic health.115 What follows is an initial cut on that claim.
A. The Source of the Problem: Division or Inertia?
In order to see the case for spillovers, it’s helpful to begin with a question: What sort of worry do those who oppose spillovers have in mind?
Remember that spillovers come in many flavors. Some involve substantial
economic costs, and some don’t. Some are highly salient (morally, culturally, politically), and some aren’t. Mapping these categories gives you a sense
of where they fit in the literature.
Table 1.
High Costs and Low Costs
High Economic Costs

Low Economic Costs

High Salience
1. California’s emissions regulations;
Georgia’s lax gun enforcement; certain
immigration policies

Low Salience
2. The type of rent-seeking
legislation often struck down under
the dormant Commerce Clause

3. Same-sex marriage; English-only
laws; Texas’s efforts to rewrite
textbooks in a more conservative
direction

4. Most other state laws

1. Classifying Spillovers
Scholars who write about economic spillovers focus on Boxes 1 and 2—
those involving high economic costs.116 They worry about the weapons that

115. We recognize that we can’t fully defend this account in a single article—perhaps ever,
given the endogeneity problem. Ours is a system in which some spillovers have been suppressed, but spillovers aplenty remain. If you think the current system is working, it’s hard to
know whether that’s because we’ve done a good job of cabining spillovers and ought to cabin
more or because spillovers aren’t as damaging as some fear they are. Unfortunately, the Good
Lord has not provided us with a parallel universe in which to run the experiment necessary to
determine who is right.
116. For an example of some of the best recent work on this subject, see Issacharoff &
Sharkey, supra note 28, at 1356 (discussing how the Supreme Court has “attempted to capture
the considerable benefits that flow from national regulatory uniformity and to protect an
increasingly unified national (and international) commercial market from the imposition of
externalities by unfriendly state legislation”).
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states wield in interstate trade wars and the policies that erode the conditions for national commerce.
Economically costly spillovers are not the only ones that scholars seek to
cabin, however. While some worry about policy spillovers with high economic costs, others wring their hands about spillovers that are highly salient
in the political realm (Boxes 1 and 3).117
Some economic spillovers fit this category. California’s emissions regulations, for instance, are both costly to American business and salient in the
political realm. Indeed, their political salience may even rise with their economic costs.118 After all, it’s not just environmental types who care about
California’s emissions standards; it’s also powerful interest groups in the
auto industry.
Spillovers that are economically costly can also be of low salience to
everyday citizens. Much of the courts’ dormant Commerce Clause docket
fits in this category. It may be costly, for example, if a state requires curved
mudguards instead of straight ones for trucks that pass through its territory.119 But the few people who sit up late at night worrying about their
state’s mudguard policy are unlikely to find partners at a cocktail party, let
alone in the political arena. Conventional rent-seeking legislation imposes
costs on outsiders, but it’s rarely the stuff of political drama.
High-salience spillovers matter even when they impose minor costs on
out-of-state residents. Recognizing same-sex marriages performed out of
state obviously involves some administrative costs. But that’s not what gets
people agitated. It’s the moral or cultural or psychic costs associated with
their state’s acknowledgment of these marriages that makes the marriages
salient. So, too, when Texas revises its textbooks in order to convey a socially
conservative view, residents of blue states must choose between purchasing
mass-market textbooks whose worldview they reject or paying more for
their preferred educational message by purchasing from smaller presses.120
Here again, the issue is salient, but the associated economic costs are
modest.
Scholars’ arguments against high-salience spillovers rest not on claims
about national markets or economic efficiency but on notions of sovereignty, territoriality, and self-rule.121 Indeed, some scholars—particularly the
ones interested in developing a transsubstantive account of horizontal federalism—find these high-salience spillovers to be just as troubling as economically costly ones.122
117. E.g., Erbsen, supra note 5 (on regional conflict); Metzger, supra note 2 (on DOMA).
118. Thanks to Ben Moskowitz for suggesting this point.
119. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 525 (1959).
120. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 50–52; infra Section IV.A.
122. This point is made evident by the fact that the scholars we’re discussing here lump
the two together as if they were equivalent. Other scholars, in sharp contrast, confine their
attacks on spillovers to the economic context. E.g., Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 28.
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These scholars seem to have a distinct picture in mind. They worry
about chaos and conflict. They fear that the issues that split the states are
divisive enough to exercise a centrifugal effect on the polity. On this view,
states are a tool for maintaining peace between political camps because they
let political foes control their own policymaking enclaves.
Those who favor policing high-salience spillovers place special emphasis
on the principles of sovereignty, territoriality, and self-rule for good reason.
All three, of course, are necessary to cabin warring factions and maintain the
policymaking enclaves on which (they think) national unity depends. But
these principles are also normative goods unto themselves. Little wonder
that so many believe that we should suppress conflict, confine state policies
within territorial boundaries, preserve regulatory enclaves, and ensure that
majorities within each state are able to regulate entirely as they see fit without interference from their neighbors.
2. Balancing the Costs and Benefits
It is here that we depart most substantially from the emerging scholarly
consensus. The literature treats politically salient spillovers in much the
same way as it treats economically costly ones—as if they involved all costs
and no benefits. We do not. We think the case for regulating low-salience,
economically costly spillovers (Box 2 in our matrix) is easy. The democratic
benefits are small, and the economic costs are high. There will often be good
reason to regulate even high-salience spillovers when the economic costs are
steep enough (Box 1), although here our account complicates the
cost–benefit analysis.
We take a quite different view of high-salience spillovers (Boxes 1 and 3)
than most scholars who write in this area. To begin with, we are skeptical
that run-of-the-mill spillovers are likely to split the polity. Slavery was an
issue that split the polity. But for the last several decades—arguably, for the
last century—interstate spillovers have been quite prevalent, and yet no one
has worried about secession. High-salience spillovers may be a source of
annoyance, even anger, but they aren’t the sort of conflict of which civil wars
are made. We thus assume the nation is sufficiently unified to withstand a
fair amount of interstate brouhaha. Friction, of course, has its costs even
when national unity is not at stake; a well-functioning national system can
still suffer death by a thousand cuts. But here, again, even in the face of
pervasive spillovers, we’ve plainly muddled through.
We don’t premise our affirmative case for spillovers solely on the notion
that worries about interstate friction are overstated. That premise would
simply counsel in favor of letting more of them go unregulated. Our claim,
however, is that interstate friction engenders important democratic benefits.
That’s because we worry not just about instability but stasis—not just about
conflict but its absence.
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3. The Costs of a Frictionless System: Undermining National Politics
We all know that friction can be costly, but we miss the fact that a
frictionless system comes with its own costs. There will be times when the
enclave solution is too easy—when national elites have every incentive to
relegate tough questions to local decisionmakers rather than forge a compromise at the national level. One might sensibly worry that certain issues—
immigration, guns, gay rights—never get on the national agenda because
national elites have no incentive to dip into the controversy. They are reluctant to talk about these issues precisely because they are important to everyday citizens.
You might ask why we should care if national elites duck an issue. Why
not just let every enclave resolve the issue for itself? Here our arguments are
animated by the view that federalism ought to exercise a centripetal rather
than a centrifugal force on the polity123—that federalism should push us
toward a national consensus on issues that matter to its people, not license
politicians (or their constituents) to take the easy out. National politicians
ought to be doing the hard work of democratic compromise rather than
pawning off these decisions on their local brethren. Everyday Americans
should be forced into the most honorable but least fun of democratic activities: compromise. It was too easy to let states in the Jim Crow South resolve
questions of racial equality by themselves. It’s been too easy for the national
government to let states navigate the hard questions raised by gun rights and
gay rights. Red and blue silos, policymaking enclaves, national policy
amounting to nothing more than a series of exceptions—these phenomena,
in our view, are not the products of a well-functioning democracy.
The national consensus need not be uniform. It might well be that we
ultimately conclude that some exceptions to the national norm are acceptable. Some think that’s what liberalism is all about.124 But “checkerboard
policies”125 shouldn’t depend entirely on self-interest and inertia.126 They
should be adopted only after we’ve had the type of debate that national
politicking alone can drive.
Although one of us has written at length about the relationship between
federalism and dissent,127 here our main concern is less with the dissenting
minority than with the diffuse majority. As Professor Ackerman, among
123. For an effort to develop this sort of nationalist account for vertical federalism, see
Gerken, supra note 11, at 44–73.
124. E.g., Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship 12 (1970) (arguing that “the historical basis of liberalism is in large part simply a
series of [ ] recognitions” of “the claims of smaller groups” for exemptions from general rules).
125. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 179 (1986).
126. We recognize that this is an entirely debatable premise. As Rosen observes, “pluralism
is hard, and why should the dissenting minority need issue-by-issue approval from the majority anyway?” Email from Mark Rosen, Professor of Law, Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law, Ill. Inst. of
Tech., to Heather Gerken, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch. (July 15, 2013, 1:01
PM EDT) (on file with author).
127. See Gerken, supra note 11; Gerken, supra note 105.
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others, has pointed out, those concerned with the health of our democracy
should worry not just about discrete and insular minorities but about diffuse and anonymous majorities as well.128
There are times when national gridlock prevents the majority from persuading politicians to entertain their concerns, let alone implement their
policies. Examples abound. Immigration is a perennial worry for Americans,
but national politicians have treated it as something of a third rail. Similarly,
even in the wake of DOMA’s demise, the odds of Congress addressing marriage equality are slim. Indeed, if you survey Congress’s work over the last
decade, it’s failed to pass major legislation in a wide variety of areas that are
highly salient to the American people. That’s even true of economic legislation, despite its extraordinary importance in politics. We shouldn’t have to
wait for the imminent collapse of the banking system to get something done
in Washington.
National gridlock is the product of two things. The first is political: national politicians lack incentives to dive into a controversial area. The second
is structural: the thicket of constitutional and subconstitutional procedural
barriers to legislation. The lawmaking process is filled with vetogates—opportunities for small groups of legislators to block or slow legislation. A
small and dedicated minority perched atop a vetogate can block even
broadly popular legislation.
We worry not just about diffuse majorities but about latent ones as well.
In many instances, people’s views on important issues are simply inchoate,
even unformed.129 A majority cannot coalesce without the help of political
elites serving as “conversational entrepreneurs”130 and political controversies
serving as lightning rods. Both help frame issues and elicit voter
preferences.131
National elites have a huge advantage over their local counterparts in
helping a majority view coalesce. People pay more attention to national
politics. Few things do more to convert latent majorities into real ones than
128. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985).
129. It is for this reason that E.E. Schattschneider argued that the ability to define a problem and its solution “is the supreme instrument of power.” E.E. Schattschneider, The
Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America 68 (1975).
130. Robert W. Bennett, Talking It Through: Puzzles of American Democracy 37
(2003).
131. Within the legal academy, Professor Kang has done some of the best work in this
area. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 Yale L.J. 734 (2008). In
the realm of social science, the literature builds on the work of Erving Goffman. See Erving
Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (1974). For a
sampling of this literature, see, for example, Frank R. Baumgartner & Bryan D. Jones,
Agendas and Instability in Public Policy (1993); Shanto Iyengar & Donald R. Kinder,
News That Matters: Television and American Opinion (1987); William H. Riker, The
Art of Political Manipulation (1986); Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox and Political Reason (1988); Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 Ann. Rev.
Pol. Sci. 103 (2007); James N. Druckman, Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects, 98 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 671 (2004); and Deborah
A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 Pol. Sci. Q. 281 (1989).
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a national brouhaha. But, of course, national elites aren’t particularly enamored of national brouhahas, which means that the most important fights will
happen only at the local level.
4. The Costs of the “Big Sort”: Undermining State Politics
There are other democratic costs to a system checkered with red and
blue enclaves. Choice is a celebrated feature in federalism discourse, and
rightly so. Indeed, one of the most common arguments against spillovers
invokes the values of democratic self-rule, the notion that each polity ought
to set policy for itself and itself alone. We acknowledge these benefits in the
next Part, but we also insist that there are costs to what Bill Bishop evocatively terms the “Big Sort.”132
Just as the Big Sort excuses national officials from doing the tough work
of democratic compromise, it also excuses state officials from the same
work. Because no state is homogenous, state officials are always aware that
not everyone is happy with the enclave they’ve built for their citizens, be it
red or blue. But vetogates and self-interested politicians can be as problematic in state legislatures as they are in Congress. Absent resistance by localities within the state,133 arguments for change are presented by people who
usually lack the votes to do anything about it. State politicians have every
incentive to count the votes and brush the gadflies aside. Radio silence is the
prerogative of power. On too many issues, state officials lack much by way of
an incentive to cross party lines or compromise with those who seek change,
something that can result in the same type of stasis and lockup that exists at
the federal level.
We worry not just that the enclave solution is too easy for political elites
but that it’s too easy for everyday citizens. It’s too comfortable to sort oneself into homogenous communities and ignore those with different views.
The Big Sort prevents citizens from living under someone else’s law or trying out someone else’s policies. Opportunities for democratic engagement
are reduced. More importantly, as we discuss below, incentives for democratic engagement are reduced.
If you think that living under someone else’s law isn’t a democratic
good, think harder. Enclaves encase us in a protective policymaking bubble
and shield us from laws with which we disagree. As we explain below, when
citizens of one state must accommodate the preferences of another’s, they
are enlisted in the practice of pluralism. They are reminded that they are not
just part of a state but part of a union.134 A vibrant democracy depends not
just on choice but on accommodation, compromise, and engagement. These
132. Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is
Tearing Us Apart (2009). Bishop was talking about a far more granular form of sorting than
we do here, but we nonetheless think the general point holds.
133. See Gerken, supra note 105.
134. Thanks to Xiao Wang for suggesting this formulation. As Professor LaCroix has
shown, the notion of union was central to early debates over federalism. Alison LaCroix, Essay,
The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 Yale L.J. 1626 (2014).
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are not the habits that enclaves cultivate. With the easy comforts of the Big
Sort comes the risk that we lose sight of the other side and, concomitantly,
our ability to engage with it. Spillovers force engagement and thereby spur
the processes on which our democracy depends.
***
We recognize, of course, that ours is a contested vision of what ails our
democracy. But so is the other side’s. We aren’t attempting to establish that
our assessment is the correct one; we doubt that could be done in a single
paper, let alone a subpart. All we wish to establish here is that there are two
plausible descriptions of the current state of affairs. After all, those who
worry about interstate friction don’t have a knock-down argument on the
facts, either. To the contrary, the evidence they offer on the dangers of interstate friction doesn’t go much past gloomy reminders about the Articles of
Confederation.135
Moreover, while we certainly don’t have a magic measuring stick to establish that ours is the correct assessment, neither do those who emphasize
the risks associated with interstate friction. It’s possible that both sides are
correct. It’s possible that we swing like a pendulum between the two extremes. But as long as both remain realistic possibilities, we ought to be
attentive to both accounts and tailor our regulatory strategy to whichever
state of affairs currently prevails.
Put differently, we believe that interstate friction is much like
state–federal friction. Friction at the vertical level can lead to all sorts of
problems, including inefficiency, conflict, and division. Federalism scholars
don’t deny these problems. They simply insist that we also pay attention to
the productive possibilities associated with state–federal friction, that we recognize that too little conflict can be as problematic as too much. The key is
achieving the right balance. And it’s worth noting that scholars of vertical
federalism haven’t come up with a magic measuring stick for striking that
balance, either.136 Nonetheless, vertical federalism has muddled through, and
we think that horizontal federalism can do the same.
B. The Solution to Inertia and Enclaves: Spillovers
If you accept our admittedly contestable account of the problem—that
we should worry as much about inertia as brouhahas, as much about the
comfort of enclaves as the discomfort of conflict—then you can see why
spillovers matter. Spillovers mitigate the problems associated with inertia
and enclaves by generating other types of problems—controversies and conflicts and costs that are far more likely to galvanize democratic engagement
135. See, e.g., Erbsen, supra note 5, at 511–12, 533–34; Laycock, supra note 7, at 316 &
n.337; Metzger, supra note 2, at 1479–80.
136. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda for Uncooperative Federalists, 48 Tulsa
L. Rev. 427, 436–37 (2013).
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than yet another editorial, yet another protest, yet another blog post. Spillovers put issues on the national agenda, convert inchoate majorities into
cohesive ones, and overcome congressional gridlock. They also enlist state
politicians and their constituents in the project of pluralism, forcing state
officials to engage and state citizens to take their democratic lumps.
Put differently, the high-salience spillovers described in our matrix
above bring with them a set of underappreciated benefits that must be
weighed against their costs. While we have no quarrel with the impulse to
look to courts to cabin low-salience, economically costly spillovers (Box 2),
high-salience spillovers (be they economically costly, as with Box 1, or not,
as with Box 3) require a different accounting than they’ve received in the
literature.
1. Spillovers and the Problem of Inertia
Spillovers mitigate the problems associated with policymaking inertia
because they provide the friction necessary to ignite the national policymaking process.137
a. Agenda Setting
Spillovers can get issues on the national policymaking agenda, which is
no mean feat these days. The enclave strategy makes life easy for national
elites because no one is demanding that they do anything. But when enclaves
break down and one side forces its unwelcome policies on the other, the
put-upon party almost inevitably looks for a federal referee. Auto executives
who hate California’s strict environmental policies plead with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to preempt them.138 Opponents of marriage equality seek assurances from Congress that they need not recognize
same-sex marriages performed in other states.139 States ravaged by gun violence ask courts to force other states to tighten their regulations.140 If you
want to get something on the national agenda, in short, you might take a
lesson from a first-grade classroom. One way to get the teacher’s attention is
to raise your hand. The other is to pull the pigtails of the girl sitting next to
you.141
137. To be sure, some of these benefits come from the mere existence of policymaking
diversity. See Gerken, supra note 105. Spillovers magnify the power of policymaking differences; they are to jurisdictional diversity as steroids are to athletic prowess. Many thanks to
Alex Hemmer for pushing us on this point.
138. See sources cited infra note 143.
139. See sources cited infra notes 165–166.
140. See source cited supra note 96.
141. We recognize that agenda setting is not an unqualified good. Thanks to Bruce Ackerman and Ernest Young for reminding us that too many things on the agenda can overwhelm
federal decisionmakers. Given the current paralysis in Washington, however, overloading the
national agenda isn’t our worry right now.
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Note the dynamic relationship between state and national policymaking
that spillovers unleash. Spillovers don’t just push issues onto the national
agenda; they push issues onto state agendas as well. Sometimes, as we discuss below, that’s because state officials are forced to work the issues out
themselves. Other times, however, the push for state regulation comes because spillovers provide opportunities for backdoor policymaking.142 The interest group that blocks legislation in Congress often can’t block that
legislation in every state. Climate-change advocates stymied in Congress, for
example, have persuaded California to pass regulations that affect cars sold
throughout the country. Spillovers are a key reason these alternative state
avenues are so attractive. If a local law can have a regional or national impact, then states offer potential fora for backdoor national policymaking. It
may not be a normatively attractive strategy, but it’s a politically irresistible
one.
b. Overcoming Gridlock
Backdoor policymaking eventually spurs front-porch debates, pushing
issues onto the policymaking agenda. As a result, spillovers serve a second,
related democratic purpose: overcoming national gridlock. This argument
has been repeatedly made in the academic literature.143 In environmentallaw scholarship, it even has a name—“defensive preemption,” used to describe how state spillovers reverse industry opposition to broadly popular
legislation and thus break up congressional gridlock.144
This policymaking dynamic works in an intuitive way. Typically, those
who seek change bear the full price of inertia, while those who oppose
change reap all of inertia’s benefits. When interest groups use states for
backdoor policymaking, they upset the status quo. Spillovers thus shift the
costs of inertia, something that often prompts proponents and opponents of
a policy to demand a national solution.
Spillovers can reduce legislative inertia in another way. Absent spillovers, minorities using vetogates to block legislation bear no cost for their
intransigence. They have two options—prevent a policy from being enacted
(total victory) or allow that policy to be enacted (complete defeat). But spillovers change that calculus: blocking a policy from being enacted at the national level is only a partial victory because the state spillovers remain. The
142. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 28.
143. For two of the most intelligent formulations outside the area of environmental law,
see Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National Perspective on the
Benefits of State Participation, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1015, 1017, 1057 (2001) (arguing that state
involvement in foreign affairs can “overcom[e] bureaucratic inertia at the central level of governance”), and Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2007) (discussing preemption doctrine and
the role of business interests in setting Congress’s agenda).
144. See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1506–16 (2007); Elliott et al., supra note 36,
at 326–29.
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gap between the status quo and the new policy becomes narrower. As a
result, opponents may moderate or drop their opposition.
c.

Eliciting National Preferences

Spillovers are also useful because they can help elicit majoritarian preferences. Inertia runs deep in American politics. People aren’t inclined to engage with an issue unless they must. Spillovers force engagement in a way
that conventional forms of advocacy (editorials, political ads, even protests)
rarely do. The costs and conflicts engendered by spillovers can provide the
spark needed to jumpstart the policymaking process, pulling national elites
into the controversy even when they’d rather avoid it. And national elites
play a crucial role in forging national positions. Without political elites
pounding the table, framing the issue, and pushing a policy forward, the
electorate’s view on an issue will often remain inchoate.145
Spillovers don’t just prompt the majority to clarify what its actual preferences are but also ensure that, when the national majority engages, the
issues aren’t merely theoretical. Proponents of the policy can offer not just
abstract arguments but concrete policymaking examples. They can offer not
just an idea but a real-life instantiation of that view.146
A good example of the role that interstate spillovers play in prodding
national policymaking can be seen with the Clean Air Act.147 Air pollution is
a classic spillover, with upwind states imposing the costs of their lax regulations on their downwind neighbors.148 During the 1960s, weak federal regulation failed to fix this problem.149 Eventually, interstate conflict over the
issue—the most visible conflict being a fight between Ohio and West Virginia over pollution from a Union Carbide plant—put the problem on the
national agenda.150 The debates that ensued changed the views of national
elites and eventually resulted in the passage of the 1970 amendments to the
Clean Air Act.151 This story occurred twice more. When air pollution persisted in the wake of the 1970 amendments, environmental groups first
145. While spillovers can attract the polity’s attention, they may cause enough friction to
polarize voters, something that may make the national fight more difficult (or at least a good
deal more passionate). Thanks to Cristina Rodrı́guez for pushing us on this point.
146. See Gerken, supra note 105.
147. Many thanks to Rosa Po for suggesting this example.
148. See Valerie Lee, Interstate Sulfate Pollution: Proposed Amendments to the Clean Air Act,
5 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 71, 76 (1981); Daniel B. Trinkle, Cars, Congress, and Clean Air for the
Northeast: A Separation of Powers Analysis of the Ozone Transport Commission, 23 B.C. Envtl.
Aff. L. Rev. 169, 169 (1995); Kay M. Crider, Note, Interstate Air Pollution: Over a Decade of
Ineffective Regulation, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 619, 620–21 (1988).
149. See Geoffrey L. Wilcox, New England and the Challenge of Interstate Ozone Pollution
Under the Clean Air Act of 1990, 24 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1 (1996).
150. See Bruce M. Kramer, Transboundary Air Pollution and the Clean Air Act: An Historical Perspective, 32 U. Kan. L. Rev. 181, 189 (1983).
151. See Bruce M. Kramer, The 1970 Clean Air Amendments: Federalism in Action or Inaction?, 6 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 47, 58 (1974); Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in
the United States, 32 J. Air Pollution Control Ass’n 44, 55–57 (1982).
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looked to the courts for help.152 After the courts refused to put an end to
these spillovers, states and environmental groups again turned to Congress
and again used spillovers to justify federal intervention, resulting in the 1977
amendments. The same pattern occurred during the 1980s, with courts
again refusing to referee this fight153 and a coalition of states (particularly
New England states) leading the charge within the EPA and on Capitol Hill.
That battle eventually resulted in another set of important changes to the
Clean Air Act in 1990.
2. Spillovers and the Problem of Enclaves
a. Spillovers and State Officials
Just as spillovers help us overcome policymaking inertia, they also mitigate the problems associated with the Big Sort. Spillovers force state politicians to suit up and get in the game, just as they do with national politicians.
As noted above, state politicians have too many incentives to cater to their
majorities while ignoring their dissenters.154 But one state’s dissenters are
another state’s majority, which means they can impose from the outside
positions that they cannot demand from the inside. When these spillovers
occur, state politicians cannot maintain their radio silence. It’s hard to ignore the opposition when it is imposing its views on your unhappy constituents. Oftentimes, as noted above, state politicians will look to a national
referee when they encounter this problem.155 But when a national umpire is
unavailable, spillovers force state politicians to do what they are supposed to
do: politic.
Note here the continuities between this idea and the literature on competitive federalism.156 It is a commonplace in that literature that interstate
competition—states’ competing for one another’s citizens by passing attractive policies—pushes states to change their ways.157 One might even think of
these efforts to compete as a form of spillover (a low tax rate in one state
attracts residents of another, reducing the size of the latter’s tax base). And
just as spillovers force residents of one state to live under the laws of another
state, spillovers can also jumpstart state policymaking. Like the federal government, states suffer from elite indifference, legislative gridlock, and minority obstruction. Spillovers prod state policymakers into action, forcing
political elites to debate policies they’d rather ignore or solve problems
they’d rather not address.
152. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 1973).
153. See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Air Pollution Control
Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1094 (6th Cir. 1984).
154. See supra Section III.A.4.
155. See supra Section III.B.1.
156. For a sampling of this vast literature, see Competition Among States and Local
Governments (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991) and Thomas R. Dye, American Federalism: Competition Among Governments (1990).
157. E.g., Zimmerman, supra note 42; see also Bowman, supra note 44.
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Spillovers don’t just push politicians to act; they push them to accommodate those with a different view. When a spillover occurs, state officials
are forced to cross political boundaries, not just territorial ones. State elites
must learn to reach across party lines. They must compromise, build coalitions, and find common ground. They are forced to politic not just as representatives of their state but as members of a union. After all, “Our
(Horizontal) Federalism” places state officials in a complex, iterated game in
which turnaround is fair play. States can inflict spillovers themselves as well
as have spillovers inflicted upon them. State officials must think not just
about which of their policies shouldn’t extend beyond the state’s borders but
also about which ones should. They must worry not just about spillovers but
also about spillunders. Spillovers, in short, enlist state elites in the practice of
pluralism and pull them into the maintenance of a union.
Consider, for instance, how the UCC came about. Conflicting state regulations were causing a variety of problematic spillovers, with different interest groups in different places blocking individual states from passing
sensible fixes. Spillover problems became serious enough that the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) took on
the project of drafting a model code. It thereby provided an institutional site
for state officials to mobilize and resolve this problem without the assistance
of a federal referee. The NCCUSL was forced to think about when, precisely,
state policies should reach past state lines and when they shouldn’t.
The UCC succeeded in part because it gave states a useful shortcut for
updating their laws.158 And like all model codes, the UCC provided a “focal
point” for passing legislation.159 But less noticed—and perhaps more important—was that the UCC also provided a focal point for politicking and compromise. Indeed, the UCC has been substantially revised to address state
opposition,160 and parts of it were deliberately drafted to allow for diverging
state practices or to avoid provoking the relevant interest groups.161 While
158. See generally Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. Legal Stud. 131, 140 (1996) (discussing how uniform laws reduce
drafting costs).
159. See id. at 139 (discussing the role of model laws as a focal point for interstate
competition).
160. Fred H. Miller, The Uniform Commercial Code: Will the Experiment Continue?, 43
Mercer L. Rev. 799, 817 (1992). Similarly, the NCCUSL decided not to enact a uniformpayments law that it had “directed a drafting committee to create” because “banks disliked the
law.” Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 595, 641–42 (1995).
161. See Lawrence J. Bugge, Commercial Law, Federalism, and the Future, 17 Del. J. Corp.
L. 11, 29 (1992); Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial
Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 605, 629 (1981); Homer Kripke,
The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Universal Commercial Code, 1962 U. Ill. Legal F.
321, 327; Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process:
Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 83, 100–01, 103 (1993).
This is exactly what two prominent academics predict. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 160, at
637 (noting that uniform-law groups “will produce many [vague] rules” and “have status quo
bias that induces them to reject reforms that any cohesive interest group would oppose”).
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that fact frustrates academics,162 with their penchant for intellectual purity,
it is precisely this type of compromise that made it possible for every state to
adopt the UCC. Indeed, second-best solutions of this sort are just what we
would expect from one of the political institutions safeguarding horizontal
federalism. Spillovers, in sum, teed up a political process that resulted in a
mutually beneficial solution for all parties concerned. State policymaking
processes were prodded forward, gridlock was overcome, and the states were
able to reach compromises that addressed the source of conflict between
them while modernizing their own codes.
b. Spillovers and State Citizens
Spillovers also enlist everyday citizens in the practice of pluralism.163 At
the very least, they prevent those of us ensconced in our blue and red enclaves from being oblivious. We are reminded that other viewpoints exist—
that some people believe in the morality of same-sex marriage and that
others think we ought to teach morality in schools. Better yet, we are exposed to other views in their most concrete form. It is too easy to dismiss
challenges to our preferred status quo, especially when the alternative is
purely hypothetical. But spillovers bring that hypothetical to life and, in doing so, they often reveal that fears about a new policy are unfounded. By
forcing automobile manufacturers to develop new emission-control technology in the late 1970s, for example, California showed that cars could be
made more fuel efficient without unduly raising sticker prices. Similarly,
thanks to states like Massachusetts, we are now able to start assessing
whether the dire predictions made by opponents of same-sex marriage have
any basis in reality.
Spillovers don’t just remind us that other viewpoints exist but force us
to engage with them. Because spillovers make it harder for us to disappear
into our own policymaking Edens, they push us toward the many forms of
voice that politicking involves.164 Indeed, spillovers ensure that those least
likely to be receptive to a policymaking idea—those nestled in enclaves with
the opposite policy—confront the policy directly. The progressives who decry social conservatism might actually have to read the Texas school board’s
preferred texts. They might even have to think about why other Americans
think these issues are important. Opponents of same-sex marriage might
162. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 677 (2d ed. 1985)
(“[T]he problems for reform [undertaken by uniform-law organizations] . . . were problems of
logic and consistency. . . . [B]asically, modern and uniform codes were mealymouthed or at
best meliorative.”).
163. Rodrı́guez has made a variant of this point in work that focuses largely on vertical
federalism. In her view, state and local sites can “amplif[y] the polity’s capacity for politics.”
Rodrı́guez, supra note 111, at 4. They do so by creating sites for working out conflict, thereby
teaching us the skills required for integration as we continually revisit the problem of accommodation in local and state nodes. Id. at 4 & n.8.
164. This frame, of course, comes from Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970). Thanks to Sundeep Iyer and Allan Erbsen for suggesting this frame.
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find themselves living next to a same-sex couple. Whether those encounters
soften people’s views or catalyze a political fight, they help spur democratic
engagement.
Spillovers also force us to live under someone else’s law, which is a democratic good unto itself and an essential practice for a robust union. In politics, we usually ask voters what they want rather than what they can live with.
But the second question is far more important in a diverse polity like ours.
Spillovers elicit the answer to this second question by forcing voters to live
under someone else’s regulations for a bit. They must drive a more fuelefficient car. Or teach from a textbook more conservative than they’d prefer.
Or live next to someone who owns guns that would be difficult to purchase
in state. It may be that they discover that the spillover policy isn’t as bad as
they thought—that the consequences weren’t as dire, that the slope wasn’t as
slippery. Or it may be that engaging with the policy cements their view that
the policy is a mistake.
That leads us to another benefit associated with spillovers: they tell us
not just what policies we can live with but which ones we can’t. In our
highly polarized system, it sometimes seems like we disagree on everything.
Spillovers help us sort out annoying differences that prompt little more than
a collective shrug from genuinely deep disagreements that require our collective attention. Spillovers tell us a great deal more than polling or voting
about where our priorities really lie. Which means they tell us a great deal
more than polling or voting about whether a modus vivendi can be had.
Same-sex marriage is a good example of spillovers’ effects on everyday
politics. When the Hawaii Supreme Court set the state on the path toward
same-sex marriage,165 the national reaction was swift and severe.166 Even the
possibility of such a ruling prompted numerous states to pass “defense of
marriage” bills to ensure that Hawaii’s policy didn’t spill over into other
states.167 Moreover, just as one would expect, state officials turned to a national referee, prodding Congress to pass DOMA in 1996. The threat of the
Hawaii spillover suggested that, at that time, a modus vivendi was
unattainable.
Things change. When the Massachusetts Supreme Court required the
state to issue same-sex marriage licenses, Massachusetts’s leadership, obviously worried about spillovers, tried to confine the effects of the decision to
its own territory by limiting same-sex marriage licenses to state residents.168
(The state ultimately abandoned this policy and ended up marrying same-

165. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Hawaii 1993) (holding that sex-based marriage
classification is subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution).
166. For an account, see Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar:
Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage 57–60 (2013).
167. See id. at 58.
168. Pam Belluck, Romney Won’t Let Gay Outsiders Wed in Massachusetts, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 25, 2004, at N1, available at www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/us/romney-won-t-let-gay-outsiders-wed-in-massachusetts.html.
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sex couples from out of state.)169 The city of San Francisco, which was issuing same-sex marriage licenses during the same period, deliberately courted
a spillover brouhaha by issuing marriage licenses to anyone willing to make
the trip to California. These policies forced political actors in other states—
who had previously ducked the issue—to take a stand on whether those
marriages were valid. Spillovers gave the marriage-equality movement a toehold even in states that weren’t ready to issue same-sex marriage licenses by
forcing reluctant state elites to introduce the subject to their constituents.170
As more states began to marry same-sex couples and those couples began to
move, same-sex marriage became a reality for everyday Americans, even
those residing outside of blue enclaves. We cannot tell, of course, whether
this day-to-day exposure has helped further the cause of marriage equality.
But one suspects it might have. It is one thing to vote against marriage
equality in the privacy of the voting booth or tell a pollster that you revile
same-sex marriage. But when a gay couple buys the house next door and
shows up with a casserole, that position is harder to maintain.
Spillovers, in short, create opportunities for all of us to live under someone else’s law, an underappreciated feature of a well-functioning democracy
and an essential practice in a well-functioning union. When we are forced to
abide someone else’s policies, we sometimes learn to accommodate one another’s preferences, to identify everyone’s second-best solution, to engage in
the practice of pluralism, or at least to figure out what we really think about
a question. It’s not easy, and it’s certainly not fun. But these democratic
benefits should matter when we tote up the costs and benefits of spillovers.
C. The Lesson of Vertical Federalism: Harnessing Friction,
Not Eliminating It
If we are correct that spillovers generate democratic benefits as well as
costs, then we ought to think of horizontal federalism much as we do vertical federalism. We need to think about how to harness friction rather than
eliminate it. We need to know when to let spillovers run their course and
when the game isn’t worth the candle. We need to distinguish not just between high-cost and low-cost economic spillovers but between high-salience
and low-salience ones as well. And we need to decide which institutional
actors are best suited for refereeing the battles that spillovers engender.
Scholars of vertical federalism have thought long and hard about a similar set of issues. They’ve also worked through many of the obvious counterarguments to the claims we are making here, those having to do with
sovereignty, self-rule, and institutional competence. As a result, that literature provides a roadmap for scholars of horizontal federalism as they move
forward.
169. Katie Zezima, Massachusetts: Same-Sex Couples from Other States May Now Marry,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 2008, at A13, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9B03E1D6103AF932A3575BC0A96E9C8B63.
170. See David Von Drehle & Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Marriage Vaulted Into Spotlight,
Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 2004, at A1.
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***
Before we turn to the claims in Parts IV and V, it is worth noting that
even those who think that spillovers provide no benefits should nonetheless
continue reading. Our descriptive claims still hold, after all. And descriptive
claims matter for federalism theory, which is as much about how federalism
actually works as about how it ought to work. Moreover, even if you think
that the democratic benefits associated with spillovers are smaller than we
do, these benefits still matter. Any effort to eliminate spillovers has a price—
that’s why so many spillovers are left unregulated in the first place. Because
spillovers present finely calibrated balancing questions, even modest benefits
should be included in that calculus.
As for our normative premises, they are obviously contestable. First,
ours is an agonistic conception of democracy,171 one that envisions politics
as a full-contact sport. While judges and scholars typically imagine state policy being made with only the state polity in mind, our account depicts states
as sites for pursuing a national agenda.172 We see state policy as a continuation of “politics by other means.”173 We also insist that learning to live with
one another involves learning to live under one another’s laws and that spillunders should matter as much as spillovers to those who care about state
power.
Second, part of our story hinges on a nationalist account of federalism174 that emphasizes how horizontal federalism serves national policymaking ends. Those who don’t share those nationalist aims may object to the
notion that crystallizing a national policy or passing national legislation is a
good thing. That is precisely why some have dismissed the idea of a safeguards argument in the first place. Young and Baker, for instance, worry
about “horizontal aggrandizement,” which occurs when a national majority
imposes its preferences on a concentrated national minority.175 If you take a
state-centered view of federalism, you might worry about ceding state autonomy for a more robust national democracy.
We’re willing to make that trade-off—and, as our descriptive account
makes clear, we think the country has already made it to a large extent. But
it is worth noting again that we don’t insist on national uniformity.176 We
believe simply that, if disuniformity ends up being national policy, it should
be a choice, not an accident. Nonetheless, our account is unquestionably
aimed at maintaining a healthy democracy, not increasing state autonomy.
171. See generally Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (1958).
172. For an elegant account of this phenomenon, see Bulman-Pozen, supra note 108, at
1078.
173. Apologies to Carl von Clausewitz. Carl von Clausewitz, On War 87 (Michael
Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1976) (1832).
174. See Gerken, supra note 11, at 10; Gerken, supra note 21, at 1889.
175. Baker, supra note 2, at 966–72; Baker & Young, supra note 2, at 117–26; see also
Pursley, Dormancy, supra note 44, at 526–27.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 124–126.
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You might think that a horizontal-safeguards argument isn’t worth
much if it doesn’t augment state autonomy. There are several problems with
that response. First, it takes too narrow a view of state power. While spillovers may do little for state autonomy, our account valorizes different and
equally important forms of state power. It emphasizes the power that states
exercise in driving national policy by virtue of the fact that they are deeply
embedded in an integrated national system. As one of us has argued elsewhere,177 that form of power is understudied and undervalued.
Similarly, as we argue at the end of this Article, our account pays a great
deal more attention to another important form of state power, one that is
overlooked in these debates: the power to ensure that a state’s policymaking
choices stick, to ensure that one state’s law crosses over into another. Those
who care the most about state power should worry as much about spillunders as spillovers, as much about state laws’ being denied an appropriate
extraterritorial reach as states’ shielding their residents from other states’
laws.
The idea that the political safeguards should be a one-way ratchet for
state autonomy not only takes too narrow a view of state power; it also takes
too narrow a view of federalism. As noted above,178 state power is not an end
unto itself. The political safeguards of vertical federalism are designed to
preserve the right kind of relationship between the states and the federal
government, not to augment state power. So, too, the goal of horizontal
federalism is not state autonomy but a democracy that works.179
IV. Counterarguments: Of Sovereignty and Courts
In Part III, we supplied what horizontal federalism currently lacks: a
descriptive and normative account as to why a good deal of interstate conflict can and should be left to politics. Once we begin to think about interstate friction in the same way we think about state–federal friction—as a
real-world phenomenon that has benefits as well as costs—then the natural
question is how best to harness its productive possibilities while minimizing
unacceptable costs. The question is twofold. How do we manage this conflict? And which institutions should manage it?
Here again, vertical federalism offers a useful roadmap. There the debate
has moved from a formalist, court-centered approach to one that acknowledges the fact of regulatory overlap and embraces the role that nonjudicial
institutions play in refereeing state–federal conflict.
Much of the literature on horizontal federalism, in sharp contrast, looks
like the early accounts of vertical federalism—court centered and dominated
by notions of sovereignty. It’s not surprising that a safeguards account has
177. See Gerken, supra note 11, at 33–44.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 21–24.
179. We take Baker and Young to be concerned about this precise issue. See Baker &
Young, supra note 2, at 117–26. They worry that the dynamic we are describing will eventually
undermine state autonomy to such an extent that states can no longer play the role they ought
to play in a healthy democratic system. Id.
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yet to take hold when the two best counterarguments against such an account—the normative claim that sovereignty should trump all else and the
descriptive assumption that courts are best suited to mediate interstate conflict—permeate the literature on horizontal federalism. It took decades to
debunk those arguments in the context of vertical federalism. Here we’ll take
an initial run at them while recognizing that a fully satisfying response requires more time and space than we have here. We hope, at least, to cast
some doubt on the idea that sovereignty and courts are any more essential to
horizontal federalism than they are to vertical federalism.
A. The Sovereignty Camp
There has long been a debate within vertical federalism about how best
to manage conflict. According to the canonical story, states and the federal
government should preside as sovereigns over their own regulatory empires.180 This “separate spheres” approach had many advantages. It was
deeply intuitive, conceptually tidy, and theoretically elegant. The problem
was that its descriptive premise was so distant from reality that it couldn’t
possibly succeed.
It is striking how closely the early work on vertical federalism mirrors
the current work on horizontal federalism. There are sovereignty fans in the
realm of horizontal federalism as well; indeed, the field seems to be dominated by them.181 Moreover, in our view, they are making the same mistakes.
Like their early counterparts in the vertical realm, scholars of horizontal
federalism rely on the notion of sovereignty in thinking about intergovernmental conflict, and much of their work is premised on the assumption that
it’s possible to cut back on regulatory overlap and confine states’ reach to
their own territories. In these debates, sovereignty tends to be a stand-in for
a larger set of normative goods, which typically includes territoriality, equality among states, and democratic self-rule.182
Erbsen, for instance, insists that states are “sovereign” because they enjoy “substantial independence and [a] significant reservoir of authority,”183

180. For a brief but illuminating history, see Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the
Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 253,
257–61 (2011).
181. See sources cited supra notes 50–52.
182. See supra notes 50–52.
183. Erbsen, supra note 5, at 499 n.9. Erbsen’s reference to sovereignty is a nuanced one.
He emphasizes that he “do[es] not take a position on precisely which aspects of sovereignty
states possess.” Id. He also criticizes the idea that the states and federal government occupy
separate regulatory spheres. See id. at 509–10. We read this as the same kind of move made by
those who favor autonomy models over sovereignty models in the context of vertical federalism. As one of us has written, while the autonomy model has softer edges and doesn’t depend
on absurdly formalistic distinctions, it is nonetheless rooted in the same conception of state
power as the sovereignty model. Both pivot off the idea of states presiding over their own
independent empires. Gerken, supra note 11, at 11–18.
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and he worries when states exercise authority beyond their borders.184 Professor Cordray argues that “each state possesses an inherent sovereign authority to govern its citizens within its territorial borders” without
interference from other states.185 Surveying the doctrinal silos that make up
horizontal federalism, she insists that they all vindicate “the core principles
of sovereignty and federalism: a state has sovereign authority within its own
jurisdiction, but that authority stops at its territorial borders.”186 Professor
Fruehwald even draws an explicit connection between the uses of sovereignty in vertical and horizontal federalism, lamenting that “[s]tates can interfere with [each other’s] state sovereignty almost as much as the federal
government can interfere with state sovereignty.”187
Just as the sovereignty types once tried to confine states and the federal
government to their own regulatory spheres, scholars of horizontal federalism often want to confine states to their own territorial spheres.188 (That’s
why they worry so much about spillovers.) Professor Florey describes this
“extraterritoriality principle” as a central justification for “invalidat[ing]
state legislation purporting to regulate out-of-state conduct.”189 Cordray insists that protecting state sovereignty “necessarily requires that the exercise
of this power be restricted to each state’s own territorial jurisdiction.”190 Laycock makes the connection between vertical and horizontal federalism explicit. Just as the Framers allocated authority between the states and the
federal government based on subject matter, he writes, they allocated authority among the states based on territory, which plays a crucial role in
defining states’ “semi-sovereign” status.191 Greve, one of the most vigorous
critics of our current system, insists that, while the prohibition against states’
regulating citizens of other states “does not appear in the text of the Constitution, its logic is so impeccable that no one has ever seriously questioned
it.”192
These scholars also offer substantial normative arguments to justify the
limits, emphasizing the importance of self-rule and equality among the
states.193 Florey insists that one of the “ideological principles of federalism”
184. See Erbsen, supra note 5, at 506, 527–28.
185. Cordray, supra note 52, at 292–93.
186. Id. at 299.
187. Fruehwald, supra note 2, at 292; see also supra note 51 (collecting additional sources).
188. See Cordray, supra note 52; Snyder, supra note 51. While Erbsen worries about the
friction generated when states try “to extend the effective reach of state authority beyond [its]
borders,” Erbsen, supra note 5, at 527, he rejects the idea that state borders can “provide an
easily enforceable starting and stopping point for each state’s regulatory power.” Id. at 509
n.49.
189. Florey, supra note 50, at 1081–82.
190. Cordray, supra note 52, at 293.
191. Laycock, supra note 7, at 296–97.
192. Greve, supra note 5, at 71. Greve recognizes that “[t]he traditional understanding, a
rule against ‘extraterritorial’ state jurisdiction,” can’t succeed but insists that certain kinds of
state spillovers—those involving “exploitation”—must be halted. Id.
193. See supra notes 50–52 (collecting sources).

102

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 113:57

is that “states are entitled to some autonomous sphere in which to make
policy free of interference from other sovereigns.”194 Greve argues that the
“irreducible constitutional baseline is state equality and integrity. Each state
must be free to govern its own affairs, without unwanted interference by
sister states. . . . [S]tate sovereignty must end at the border[ ].”195
Note also that the preference for clear rules of engagement and the orderly resolution of disputes—all hallmarks of the sovereignty approach in
vertical federalism—dominate much of the work on horizontal federalism.
Erbsen, for instance, argues that “[t]he basic problem [in horizontal federalism] is that the Constitution does not create a preference rule for prioritizing competing state interests analogous to the Supremacy Clause.”196 A
political-safeguards account, of course, would characterize that fact as a feature, not a bug. Similarly, Florey speculates that “limits on the extraterritorial reach of state legislation” might be “best understood as a means of
establishing order—and confining each state to its proper sphere of authority—in a federalist system.”197 Here again, a safeguards account would value
the messiness and overlap that horizontal federalism generates.
We understand the attractions of the sovereignty model, particularly to
the extent that it rests on notions of local democracy and self-rule. The main
problem, in our view, is that the model’s factual underpinnings are too unstable to support the doctrinal edifice built upon them. As a formal matter,
the states are sovereign. As a realistic matter, sovereignty is no more to be
had in the horizontal realm than it is in the vertical realm.
Policymaking would certainly be simpler if states’ policies never crossed
territorial lines and every state could regulate entirely as it sees fit. But, as we
note above, spillovers are ubiquitous.198 In a highly interconnected, tightly
networked system like our own, states inevitably affect one another. We thus
run into the same type of line-drawing problem we encounter in the vertical
context, where judges and scholars have all but thrown up their hands.199
Regulatory overlap is a stubborn fact in both the horizontal and vertical
realm.200 None of this is to deny that the notion of territory captures important intuitions about the rules of the game and the appropriate limits of
194. Florey, supra note 50, at 1115.
195. Greve, supra note 5, at 6 (citation omitted).
196. Erbsen, supra note 5, at 506. Unlike many others who write about horizontal federalism, Erbsen recognizes that the solutions ultimately reached may not be conceptually clean.
While he urges us to “think of horizontal federalism as encompassing the set of constitutional
mechanisms for preventing or mitigating interstate friction that may arise from the out-ofstate effects of in-state decisions,” Erbsen recognizes that these solutions will often be indeterminate, even “fuzzy.” Id. at 503, 555.
197. Florey, supra note 50, at 1093.
198. See supra Part III.
199. The Supreme Court has doggedly continued the effort in the context of the Commerce Clause, with mixed success at best, see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012), but its preemption cases confirm the difficulty of the task. Compare Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), with Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
200. Cf. Rosen, Exclusivity, supra note 27, at 1105–08.
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state power.201 But the fact that something is important doesn’t convert it
into a descriptive reality.
There are other problems with the sovereignty approach. Much of its
normative oomph comes from the idea that the states are equal to one another.202 Here again, the formal truth is belied by informal realities. Just as
there are “superstatutes”203 and “superprecedents,”204 there are what we term
superstates. Large states like California and Texas can affect the policies of
other states in a way that Rhode Island and Montana cannot. The same
holds true of horizontal localism. Los Angeles is as big as many countries. In
this way, the effects of a large city’s local regulations often can and will
swamp the regulations enacted by states with small populations and
economies.
Law may be the only field in which it is acceptable to answer a normative argument with a descriptive one. But we aren’t relying on descriptive
reality alone in insisting that sovereignty is the wrong paradigm for thinking
about horizontal federalism. There is also a strong normative case for our
position. After all, if you worry that we’ve undervalued state territoriality or
equality, we could surely try to change that state of affairs. But, as with
vertical federalism, the price for maintaining clean jurisdictional lines and
limited policymaking domains is too steep. We’d have to give up on a nationally integrated market. We’d have to give up on a nationally integrated
political system. We might even have to stop our citizens from crossing state
lines.
The most normatively appealing argument for the sovereignty approach
is the one premised on democratic self-rule.205 Why shouldn’t people regulate themselves as they see fit? It’s a deeply intuitive, deeply principled argument.206 It’s especially appealing in the context of interstate spillovers. When
national mandates intrude on state policies, we take comfort in the fact that
citizens of the affected state have participated in the decisionmaking process.
That isn’t true when one state polity affects another.
We take these arguments seriously. Our main concern, as we note above,
is that the principle of self-rule is belied by on-the-ground realities.
As with the arguments above, you might think that we ought to change
the on-the-ground realities. But would we want to sacrifice an integrated
201. Many thanks to Jed Rubenfeld for pushing us on this point. For one of the most
imaginative and thoughtful accounts of the importance of territoriality, see Laycock, supra
note 7.
202. See supra notes 194–195 and accompanying text.
203. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New
American Constitution 8 (2010).
204. Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in ‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 2005, at
C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/weekinreview/30rosen.html?_r=0.
205. See supra notes 50–52 (collecting sources).
206. The idea is so intuitive that some scholars merely refer to it in shorthand, see, e.g.,
Snyder, supra note 51, at 432 (terming interstate spillovers a “problem [that] reflects a lack of
representation”), or describe it as a bedrock principle of horizontal federalism, e.g., Florey,
supra note 50, at 1115.
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national market and an integrated national democracy in order to guarantee
more self-rule at the local level? While self-rule sounds like a trump card in
the abstract, when we recognize the normative goods we’d have to sacrifice
to attain it—the goods associated with integration—the trade-off is less appealing. We aren’t suggesting that we’ve struck the perfect balance between
separation and integration, between self-rule and accommodation. But the
“democratic self-rule” argument is often cast as a principle that can be vindicated without trade-offs. It’s not.
This is where our descriptive arguments connect to our normative ones.
Democracy is surely about self-rule. But, as we argue above, it’s also about
interaction, accommodation, and compromise—precisely the values that
our account of horizontal federalism highlights. The values of self-rule are
pitted against the value of union. Every community would like to live according to its own preferences. Every person would like to live according to
his own preferences. But we quickly learn that our preferences differ. Democracy requires individuals to do just what this Article argues that states
should do: work it out. Sometimes we work it out directly. Sometimes we
need a referee. Sometimes we just take our lumps and live under a policy we
don’t like. And we do so for a simple reason: we’d rather live with other
people than without them. Only the misanthropes and a handful of academics resist that premise. Sometimes the costs to self-rule can outweigh the
benefits of ruling together. Those are the situations when spillovers ought to
be resisted. Our point here is that democratic self-rule is often played as if it
were a trump card, and we don’t think it’s entitled to that lofty status.
B. Are Courts the Only Institution Capable of
Safeguarding Horizontal Federalism?
Sovereignty fans who write about vertical federalism look to the judiciary to preserve states’ ability to serve as rivals and competitors to the national government. Without judicially protected sovereignty, these scholars
insist, an overweening national government can simply override or swamp
conflicting state policies. Moreover, given the lawyers’ penchant for clear
jurisdictional lines and the orderly regulation of disputes, it is not surprising
that they look to the judiciary to serve as the über-referee between the states
and the federal government. Law is cleaner than politics.
Horizontal federalists share the same instincts. The vast majority of the
work is devoted to developing judicial solutions to the problem of spillovers.
One scholar makes this connection explicitly: “the Court should give as
much attention to horizontal federalism as it has given vertical federalism.”207 Another scholar devotes much of an article to classifying and identifying the many judicial means for cabining interstate friction.208 Even those
207. Fruehwald, supra note 2, at 292; cf. Baker, supra note 2, at 961 (expressing the concern that “some states will harness the federal lawmaking power to impose their policy preferences on other states to the former states’ advantage”).
208. Erbsen, supra note 5. Erbsen’s emphasis on judicial review is leavened by a nod to
Congress’s role in approving interstate compacts and preempting state law, but neither of
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who take a more instrumental approach seem to favor the courts as referees
of interstate disputes. Greve, for instance, rejects out of hand that any institutions, save the courts, can solve the problems that he identifies in today’s
system.209
Some of this may be path dependence, of course. We are all familiar
with the role that courts play in policing spillovers, and we naturally write
about those examples and think about how to extend them. But given that it
is by now a truism that legal academics are too court centered, it is interesting to see just how court centered the field remains.
If you’ve read this far, you can probably guess why we worry about a
court-centered approach. Horizontal scholars look to courts because they
offer finality and certitude. Judges are adept at picking a winner, ending a
fight, and shutting down a debate. As the case law makes clear, they tend to
cast their decisions in the vernacular of sovereignty, with its emphasis on
clear jurisdictional lines and neatly bounded regulatory enclaves.
If you value the role that spillovers play in teeing up conflict and shaking
us out of our enclave-induced stupors, however, courts become a less appealing forum for resolving interstate disputes (unless you view courts as
nothing more than another site of contestation). While courts surely play a
role in teeing up debates and working out conflict, the advantage of the
political safeguards of horizontal federalism is that they offer political solutions to interstate conflict. Political solutions are the products of compromise rather than case law. They may be less principled, but they are likely to
be more practical. They will often be reached in a process that is messy,
iterative, and nonlinear.
Finally, the political safeguards don’t just produce political solutions;
they rely on political processes. Spillovers provide opportunities for elites and
everyday citizens to acquire the habits of union, to engage in the habits of
pluralism. On this account, the process of resolving conflict matters as much
as the solution, and we should value the political institutions that safeguard
federalism even when they produce precisely the same solution courts would
offer.
V. How Do the Political Safeguards Work in Practice?
As noted above, the main goal of this Article is to provide the descriptive and normative foundation for a political-safeguards argument by showing that a good deal of interstate conflict can and should be left to the free
play of politics.
It is, of course, one thing to argue that political safeguards are a good
idea in theory. It’s quite another to show that they will work in practice.
And it’s still another to identify the precise institutional mechanisms that
these ideas serves as the main focus of the work. Id. at 536, 550–55. Erbsen’s later work suggests that he remains open to the possibility of a congressional role in regulating personal
jurisdiction. Erbsen, supra note 7, at 75–88.
209. Greve, supra note 5, at 306–07.
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make the political safeguards work in practice. In this Part, we’ll offer an
initial and necessarily limited take on these last two claims. Given that academics spent decades building this same argument for vertical federalism,
we offer merely a rough-and-ready list of the institutions that safeguard horizontal federalism and an initial survey of the materials available for studying these safeguards going forward.
A. Are the Political Safeguards Working?
The first thing to notice about “Our (Horizontal) Federalism” is that it
seems to be working about as well as any of our other constitutional structures.210 Kramer argues that vertical federalism was “an unplanned-for system that mediated disputes respecting the authority of state and federal
governments through institutions and institutional arrangements that had
not been imagined when the Constitution was ratified.”211
Much the same can be said of horizontal federalism. Despite all the academic hand-wringing, horizontal federalism appears to be an accidental but
reasonably well-functioning system. Spillovers routinely occur, and yet the
national economy is thriving. Spillovers have not led to a civil war or anything close to it. But they have played an important role in teeing up national debates and unlocking the national policymaking process. State
spillovers have led to national fights over environmental reform, gun regulation, and now same-sex marriage. Some fights have resulted in progressive
wins (environmental reform, for instance), while others have represented
conservative victories (DOMA and gun regulation being the best examples).
Spillovers have also unsettled those of us ensconced in our comfortable
red and blue enclaves. Blue states are figuring out where to buy their textbooks now that Texas has effectively rewritten most of them. Michigan politicians continue to harrumph about California’s environmental policies in
front of the EPA. Married same-sex couples now enjoy federal benefits and
are seeking these benefits from states that do not support marriage equality.
Out-of-state residents are funding unionization fights in Wisconsin or abortion referenda in South Dakota.
Returning to our spillover matrix,212 we have arguably managed to do a
fair job of shutting down the wrong kinds of spillovers and letting the more
productive ones run their course. The most damaging forms of spillovers—
low-salience, economically costly regulations that threaten the national marketplace—are heavily policed.213 Meanwhile, courts seem more reluctant to
police high-salience, high-cost spillovers—those spillovers from Box 1 where
210. We can almost hear Sandy Levinson cackling at that statement. He, of course, would
insist that we’re setting far too low a bar. See generally Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We the People
Can Correct It) (2006) (arguing for a constitutional convention to amend the Constitution).
211. Kramer, supra note 22, at 276.
212. See supra Section III.A.
213. See infra text accompanying note 119.
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our account suggests that judicial intervention is not an easy question—in
areas like firearms and environmental regulation.214
Meanwhile, most other spillovers have been left to the free play of politics, where they can be resolved—or not—by other institutions. Indeed, as
we argue in this Section, the spillovers that ought to be shut down quickly—
the high-cost, low-salience ones—are the main targets for judicial intervention, whereas judges have mostly stayed away from the high-salience spillovers that we think generate substantial democratic benefits.
“Our (Horizontal) Federalism” thus bears some resemblance to the
time-honored system that parents use to deal with restless children: the pillow fight. Things that are breakable (like a national market) are off limits,
the weapons are blunted (by a baseline of individual-rights protections),215
and the relevant actors are left to go at it. It looks, then, as if horizontal
federalism does roughly what many think vertical federalism ought to do—
maintain a healthy tension between governing institutions by allowing productive sources of conflict to move forward while shutting down those
sources of conflict that threaten the system as a whole.
B. What Are the Institutional Mechanisms for
Safeguarding Horizontal Federalism?
At this point, no one has thought to ask which institutions safeguard
horizontal federalism because no one has considered it a question worth
answering. Here we offer a preliminary answer, one that focuses on the role
of Congress, the political parties, administrative agencies, interest groups,
interstate networks, and NGOs in mediating interstate conflict. We even discuss the role that courts can play in maintaining the conditions necessary for
horizontal federalism to flourish.
We also survey the work on the subject. While none of the research is
cast in this fashion—this is our own spin, not the authors’—it nevertheless
supplies many of the building blocks for a political-safeguards argument going forward. Put differently, if the sovereigntists have their heirs in the burgeoning literature on horizontal federalism, we’re beginning to catch
glimpses of horizontal federalism’s Wechslers and Kramers.

214. Infra text accompanying notes 245–246.
215. Erbsen has suggested other strategies for blunting state weapons, including disabling
states from printing money or requiring them to share control over their militias with the
federal government. Erbsen, supra note 5, at 531–33. Professor Levitt thinks that federal removal jurisdiction plays a similar role, as it allows the federal government to prevent certain
important questions from becoming the subject of interstate conflicts. Email from Justin Levitt, Visiting Assoc. Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch., to Heather Gerken, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch. (Apr. 14, 2013, 09:30 PM EST) (on file with author).
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1. Congress
Congress is the most obvious institution safeguarding horizontal federalism,216 just as it was Wechsler’s prime candidate for safeguarding vertical
federalism. As the discussion above illustrates, Congress’s lawmaking power
makes it a natural choice for those aggrieved by an interstate spillover and
seeking a referee. Members of Congress are also tied to state officials through
a network of partisan and policymaking institutions, which makes it easy for
them to work the transmission lines that funnel interstate disputes from the
local to the national. As an institutional matter, Congress can also engage in
forms of compromise, bargaining, procrastinating, and logrolling that are
simply unavailable to courts. In short, Congress can politic when faced with
a spillover fight, and politicking is often what is necessary when interstate
conflict arises.
In recent years, a handful of academics have started to analyze Congress’s role in refereeing interstate relations. Like Wechsler, they are early
movers, pushing away from the formalist, court-centered approach to
resolving institutional conflict. Like Wechsler, they emphasize the role that
Congress can play in mediating interstate disputes. Unlike Wechsler, however, they have not set out to develop a political-safeguards account.
Metzger and Rosen have done the most prominent work. Unlike Wechsler, Metzger assumes a substantial role for the judiciary in policing interstate
conflict.217 She also rejects the idea that state institutions have a role to
play218 and seems to accept the basic tropes of the current work on horizontal federalism—sovereignty, territoriality, and democratic self-rule.219 She
216. At least when it’s playing any role at all in national politics. At the moment, Congress
is not legislating—no matter how big the political push—due to high levels of political polarization. While interstate spillovers have not solved that problem, nor has anything else. At the
very least, spillovers provide one source of pressure to force open what is now a blocked
policymaking channel. For his part, Greve rejects the view that Congress could ever remedy
what ails horizontal federalism. He describes the “near total incapacity of Congress to order
horizontal state relations” to address what he considers to be the core problem with today’s
federalism: the replacement of a competitive federal regime with a cartelized one. Greve,
supra note 5, at 288, 306–07.
217. Like those in the sovereignty camp, Metzger remains unwilling to leave interstate
disputes to the free play of politics and instead insists on “the need for a federal umpire” to
police interstate relations. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1476. In Metzger’s words, “the ultimate
question is not . . . whether both Congress and the Court should be authorized to play this
umpiring role . . . . Instead, the real question is which of these two branches of federal government should exercise primary control over interstate relations.” Id. at 1479 (emphasis added).
Metzger seems to contemplate a good deal more policing than Wechsler because she is deeply
concerned about spillovers and interstate friction. In her view, “the record of interstate discrimination under the Articles of Confederation made clear” that we cannot “have the states
themselves, through either their political branches or their courts, determine when they have
transgressed the Constitution’s interstate demands.” Id. at 1478–79.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1513–20. Rosen takes aim at some of those impulses writ large, but horizontal
federalism is just one passing example in a larger conceptual argument about what he considers a set of unfortunate intellectual habits within the law.
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insists, at least, that Congress is the final arbiter of interstate conflict, and
she favors what she describes as a system of “judicially enforceable constitutional default rules prohibiting state discrimination that are subject to an
ultimate congressional override.”220
Rosen has traveled farther along the path to a safeguards argument than
Metzger, although he, too, has done so in pursuit of a different project.
Whereas Metzger focuses on constitutional structure, Rosen emphasizes the
functional justifications for looking to Congress rather than the courts to
resolve certain forms of interstate conflict (particularly those arising under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause). What is most distinctive about Rosen’s
account is that he argues (correctly, in our view) that relations among the
states are marked as much by regulatory overlap as by territorial division.221
This insight leads Rosen to suggest generically that the “authority for resolving the scope of state extraterritorial powers . . . is left primarily to political
processes.”222 And it has led him to develop that claim with regard to Congress and disputes arising under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (which
explicitly vests Congress with decisionmaking authority). In Rosen’s view,
legislatures—especially Congress—are better suited than the courts to resolve this type of interstate fight223 because they can bargain, compromise,
and engage in interest balancing.
The work on vertical federalism should also improve our understanding
of the role that Congress plays in the horizontal realm. While we’ve written
as if there were clean divisions between horizontal and vertical federalism,
one of this Article’s key contributions is to show the close ties between interstate conflict and state–federal interactions.224 Much of the work on state–
federal relations is therefore relevant to horizontal federalism. For instance,
run-of-the-mill preemption questions implicate horizontal and vertical concerns at the same time.225 Indeed, when we focus on the dormant Commerce
Clause as the paradigmatic example of courts’ policing horizontal spillovers,
we neglect the real lesson of cases like CTS Corp. and Ouellette. Congress,
not the courts, wages many of the battles against economic protectionism.
220. Id. at 1511 (footnote omitted).
221. That is, indeed, how he came to the project. Mark D. Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role
in Determining What Full Faith and Credit Requires: An Additional Argument, 41 Cal. W. Int’l
L.J. 7, 22 (2010).
222. Rosen, State Powers, supra note 27, at 1154. Indeed, he specifically invokes Wechsler
in making this claim. Id. at 1154 n.85.
223. Rosen, supra note 221, at 22.
224. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’s Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in Nomos LV: Federalism
and Subsidiarity (James Fleming ed., forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2394106_code68368.pdf?abstractid=2284200&mired=1.
Thanks to Abbe Gluck and Allan Erbsen for suggesting this point.
225. Greve, who might well disagree with almost everything in this Article, makes a similar point, looking to federal preemption law as horizontal federalism’s “last line of defense.”
Greve, supra note 38, at 111; see also Greve, supra note 5, at 307 (“The entire structure of
horizontal federalism has been driven into preemption law . . . .”).
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Of course, that is just what one would expect in a world where the political
safeguards of horizontal federalism are working properly.
2. Networks, NGOs, Political Parties, Interest Groups,
and Private Institutions
Congress, of course, is not the only institution that mediates interstate
conflict. As Kramer points out, one of the reasons Wechsler’s account of the
political safeguards was so unsatisfying is that Wechsler confined his analysis
to formally designated constitutional structures and thus missed the crucial
role that other formal and informal institutions play in safeguarding state
power.226 By contrast, Kramer himself argues that a plethora of informal and
formal institutions—including political parties, “interlocking” state and federal agencies, think tanks, lobbies, and the like—help mediate state–federal
relations.227 Whereas Wechsler premises most of his argument on constitutional structure and exasperatingly broad generalizations about what “the
state” could do, Kramer offers a thick account of real-world institutions and
a granular analysis of how state and federal officials interact.
If we follow Kramer’s lead, we need to move past formally designated
institutions like Congress and at least begin to identify the formal and informal institutions that mediate interstate relations. Often these institutions are
the same institutions that form the connective sinews between the states and
the federal government.
The political parties, for instance, play a role in knitting together state
and local officials just as they connect state and federal officials. These connections were once fairly weak. But the centralization of the party structure,
when paired with the increasingly common practice of cross-state campaign
funding, has changed this dynamic.228
So, too, interest groups have created substantial networks among state
officials as they push policy at the local level in order to lay the groundwork
for national fights.229 That effort, in turn, generates robust networks among
state and local officials. In short, states are connected to one another for a
simple reason: they are politicking and policymaking together.
States also interact with one another outside of party and interest-group
politics. Social scientists like Zimmerman have analyzed a variety of strategies that states use to solve shared problems, including interstate compacts,

226. Kramer, supra note 22, at 219.
227. Id. at 219, 222–25.
228. For the best account, see Bulman-Pozen, supra note 108, at 1135–46.
229. See id. at 1085–86. For a survey of this literature, see Heather K. Gerken & Charles
Tyler, The Myth of the Laboratories of Democracy (June 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
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uniform laws, administrative agreements, and networking through organizations like the National Governors Association.230 On the law side, Resnik has
done yeoman’s work on this front with her research on “translocal internationalism.”231 Like Metzger and Rosen, Resnik wasn’t attempting to develop
a safeguards account.232 Nonetheless, her research on the role of social networks, public–private institutions, and translocal organizations in diffusing
ideas suggests how they might help to mediate interstate disputes.
We can find more granular examples of horizontal safeguards as well.
Extant work on interstate and interlocal compacts233 should help us understand which institutions safeguard horizontal federalism and how they do
so. There is also an interesting story about the role of private institutions like
the American Law Institute, the NCCUSL, and the American Legislative Exchange Council in mediating interstate conflicts. Consider, for example, the
NCCUSL’s work on the UCC234 or the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”),235 which was designed to prevent a parent unhappy with a custody ruling in one state from taking his or her child
to another state court. The UCC was intended to deal with the problem of
economic spillovers, while the UCCJEA was designed to deal with the problem of custodial spillunders. In each instance, the NCCUSL worked with
state stakeholders to push for a uniform law that mitigated interstate
conflict.
Our own review suggests that there are at least two preliminary lessons
to be drawn from this literature. First, the social science confirms what
politics has shown. In many areas, there are robust, cooperative networks
among federal, state, and local officials that can and do safeguard horizontal
federalism. The horizontal parts of these networks provide the fora needed
230. See Zimmerman, supra note 42, at 33–61 (interstate compacts), 183–89 (uniform
laws), 54–57 (administrative agreements), 194–95 (networking); Bowman, supra note 44 (discussing interstate compacts, multistate legal actions, and uniform state laws as mechanisms of
interstate cooperation).
231. See Resnik sources cited supra note 7; Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and
Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121
Yale L.J. 534, 571 (2011) (describing the “cross-cutting web of vertical, horizontal, and intrastate executive and legislative relationships”).
232. Instead, relying on Wechsler, her aim was to convince the courts to trim back federal
preemption and leave more room for state and local experimentation in areas that have traditionally been thought to involve national issues. Resnik sources cited supra note 7.
233. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 42; Hall, supra note 6. Professor Gillette has done
important work on these questions at the local level. See Clayton P. Gillette, The Conditions of
Interlocal Cooperation, 21 J.L. & Pol. 365 (2005); Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 190 (2001).
234. For a history and analysis, see supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text.
235. For a history and analysis, see Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand. L.
Rev. 1207 (1969); Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A Critical Reexamination of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, 25
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 845 (1992); and Linda M. DeMelis, Note, Interstate Child Custody and the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: The Continuing Search for a National Standard, 45 Hastings L.J. 1329 (1994).
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for states to work out the conflict for themselves. And the vertical dimensions of these networks allow state and local officials in conflict to pull in a
national referee when they need one without regularly resorting to the
courts.
Second, the extant work seems to suggest that most interstate interactions involve cooperation, not conflict. Most of the social science focuses on
shared projects and shared problems. To be sure, this may be a spotlight
issue. Scholars may have focused on those instances where state and local
officials have managed to get something done, and they may have neglected
those instances where an interstate conflict was not resolved. Or it may be
that spillovers are not nearly as troublesome as the current literature would
have us believe—that in fact most spillovers are handled through accommodation and compromise (or simply through learning to live with one another’s excesses). That is, of course, exactly what a safeguards argument
would suggest. Needless to say, there is a great deal more work to do before
we can reach a firm conclusion.
3. Administrative Agencies
We are less sure what to say about administrative agencies. These sites of
cooperative federalism served as one of Kramer’s primary examples of the
networks binding state and federal officials, and a number of scholars have
also examined the role that administrative agencies play in shaping the relationship between the federal government and the states.236
It is less clear what role administrative agencies play in safeguarding
horizontal federalism. To be sure, federal agencies serve an important role
on the preemption front,237 an issue that matters for interstate relations just
as it matters for state–federal relations.238 There is also evidence that states
administering the same federal law form networks that allow them to assist
one another and present a more united front against federal agencies.239 At
least in theory, one could imagine federal agencies helping states iron out
their differences.240 And state agencies often form networks to deal with
236. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 Duke L.J. 2111 (2008); Brian Galle & Mark
Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of
Federal Power, 57 Duke L.J. 1933 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New
Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability:
“Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 Duke L.J. 2125 (2009); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency
Preemption, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 521 (2012).
237. See sources cited supra note 236.
238. See supra notes 77–87, 225 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 Md.
L. Rev. 773, 828–29 (2013). For a fascinating account of how state interest groups influence
federal agencies, see Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100
Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming Sept. 2014).
240. We know, for instance, that they mediate between state interests and private interests
in the environmental sphere. E.g., Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto
Policy: Lessons from the “Car Deal”, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 343, 358–65 (2011) (describing

October 2014]

The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism

113

shared problems themselves, sometimes in an effort to stave off federal intervention.241 While we aren’t aware of any sustained work on this question, we
do see tantalizing glimpses of how this dynamic works in practice. Nonetheless, at this point, all we can do is note that this issue represents a prime
candidate for future scholarship.
4. The Courts
You might think that there is no room for courts in a political-safeguards account. It’s certainly true that some scholars of vertical federalism,
like Kramer and Choper, insist that the judiciary should stay out of the game
entirely.242 But others subscribe to the softer variant of process federalism
that Young puts forward. Young acknowledges that the state–federal conflict
does not always require a judicial referee, but he insists that the courts can
still play an Elyian, representation-reinforcing role by creating the conditions under which productive state–federal interactions can take place.243
We can see this soft form of process federalism playing out at the horizontal level as well. Even though many scholars urge the courts to get more
involved in policing spillovers, at present courts are picking their battles.
More importantly, in choosing their battles, the courts have done just
what our matrix in Section III.A suggests that they ought to be doing: shutting down costly economic spillovers while allowing politically salient spillovers to run their course. Judges plainly think that they have a role to play
in shutting down costly economic spillovers and have therefore fashioned
several tools for that purpose (e.g., the dormant Commerce Clause, preemption doctrine, and due process). While it is a familiar point that an administrative agency might do a better job policing interstate discrimination than
courts,244 the latter have at least provided a consistent forum for putting a
stop to those economic spillovers for which the game is not worth the
candle.

the EPA’s successful efforts to mediate a conflict between California regulators and automobile
manufacturers); Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the
Obama Administration, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 237, 242, 249–51 (2011) (same).
241. E.g., Hall, supra note 6, at 448–56.
242. Choper, supra note 14, at 2–3; Kramer, supra note 22, at 287–93.
243. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1349, 1395
(2001) (“We need a Democracy and Distrust for federalism doctrine—that is, a doctrine of
judicial review constructed to protect the self-enforcing nature of the federalist system.”).
244. E.g., Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 18 Urb.
Law. 567, 580–84 (1986). Amar has recently made the arresting argument that the courts’
policing of the dormant Commerce Clause traces its roots back to McCulloch, Akhil Reed
Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution 524–25 n.37 (2012), thereby recasting the
courts’ role not as a power grab but as a necessary and natural part of our constitutional
structure.
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Outside of low-cost economic spillovers, however, courts have mostly
left the states to work things out. Gun control245 and environmental regulation246 provide but two recent examples. We don’t mean to suggest that
courts are deliberately allowing the political safeguards of horizontal federalism to flourish. But they aren’t supplying aggrieved parties with the doctrinal hooks they need to stop many of the spillovers that occur. Some
commentators even think that the courts have exacerbated the spillover
problem, an argument that Greve has passionately made with regard to
products-liability law and personal-jurisdiction rules.247
The courts are picking their battles even within the domains in which
they have chosen to act. In areas like the dormant Commerce Clause, for
instance, courts have developed a working vocabulary for determining
which spillovers should be shut down and which should be allowed to run
their course. Notions of “discriminatory” and “nondiscriminatory” state
regulations offer at least a basic grammar for determining which spillovers
require court intervention and which can be left to horizontal federalism’s
political safeguards.
Personal jurisdiction represents another area in which the courts choose
their battles. Prior to 1945, the Supreme Court clung to the idea that, to
quote Pennoyer v. Neff, “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.”248 This sovereignty-based
approach forced courts to devise one formalist workaround after another to
deal with the realities of interstate travel and interstate commerce.249 Eventually, however, the courts’ sovereignty framework shattered under the pressures created by an integrated national economy.250

245. For an analysis of one such decision, see Alan Feuer, U.S. Appeals Court Rejects City’s
Suit to Curb Guns, N.Y. Times, May 1, 2008, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
05/01/nyregion/01guns.html.
246. See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Air Pollution Control Dist.
v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F.
Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d on reh’g, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Green
Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007).
247. See Greve, supra note 5.
248. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
249. The history is familiar to all. For early accounts, see Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald
T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1146–47
(1966) (explaining how the “growing mobility and complexity of modern life” lie behind jurisdictional developments in the field), and Bernard Auerbach, The “Long Arm” Comes to Maryland, 26 Md. L. Rev. 13, 14 (1966). For specific examples of these efforts, see 4 Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1065, 1066 (3d ed. 2013).
250. For a seminal critique of Pennoyer’s underpinnings, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A
General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241, 262–72. For the funniest
summary of the canonical story and an effort to complicate and undermine it, see Terry S.
Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 257, 258 (1990)
(“Many years ago (in 1877, to be exact) there came into the realm of American jurisprudence
an evil dragon known as Pennoyer v. Neff . . . .”).
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The Supreme Court famously admitted defeat in International Shoe,251
where it invoked due process as the touchstone for jurisdiction fights and
offered an approach better suited to mitigating the problem of legal spillunders. In developing this doctrine, the courts adopted a far more realistic
approach to the problems that arise between the states. Judges no longer
defined state power solely as the ability to shield residents from the influence
of other states (the spillover problem). Instead, they acknowledged that state
power sometimes includes the ability of a state to extend its reach outside its
territory (the spillunder problem).252 Finally, note that the solution on
which the courts ultimately settled was reached in conjunction with state
legislatures, which gravitated to different jurisdictional solutions (in the
form of long-arm statutes) through an iterative process.253 In doing so, state
elites were forced to think about the appropriate reach of state power, both
for their own states and for other states. The game was an iterative one, and
every state could turn the tables on other states. Despite its many flaws, this
hybrid judicial–legislative solution has proved to be remarkably stable.
We presume that a cautious, “pick-your-battles” strategy is roughly the
sort of approach we would want the courts to adopt under a political-safeguards model. On this view, it is perfectly natural—and democratically useful—for states to seek a referee when they butt heads with one another. But
it is important that there be more political referees than judicial referees. If
judges step in and stop the game too quickly, we lose out on many of the
democratic benefits that spillovers can generate. Resolving interstate conflict
in political fora is unlikely to be as conceptually neat or as definitively tidy as
the resolution a court offers. But at the same time, these solutions might be
more democratically satisfying, leaving room for compromise, iterative interactions, and muddling through.
There is, of course, a great deal more to say on this front. We might
imagine courts playing an Elyian role in the context of spillovers.254 Courts
might intervene, for instance, when the political process is unlikely to generate a solution. The dormant Commerce Clause is a good example. States
have every incentive to impose financial externalities on other states, thereby

251. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
252. For a discussion of the connections between personal jurisdiction and spillunders,
see supra text accompanying note 88.
253. To be sure, the courts play a dominant role now that so many states extend their
long-arm jurisdiction as far as due process will allow. But states, particularly Illinois, led the
way. John M. O’Connor, Jr. & James M. Goff, Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction over
Non-Residents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act, 31 Notre Dame Law. 223 (1956); see also
Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits of
Due Process, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 491, 495 n.12 (2004). Moreover, states like Illinois developed their
long-arm statutes with a close eye on judicial decisions. Robert C. Casad, Long Arm and Convenient Forum, 20 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1971); O’Connor & Goff, supra, at 232. For a history
and a catalogue of long-arm statutes, see McFarland, supra, at 492–99.
254. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980). Thanks to Noah Zatz for
suggesting this idea.
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undermining the chances of state-generated solutions. But most of these activities are too small bore to garner the attention of Congress, thus leaving
courts to do the heavy lifting. So, too, we might conclude that courts are well
suited for policing interstate conflict when there is a well-developed, fully
ventilated national consensus and all we need is day-to-day policing of the
national rule. We might even think it’s appropriate for the judiciary to intervene when the political process has played itself out and failed to reach resolution. Consider, for instance, the problem of “migratory divorces,” when
married people establish domicile in another state in order to take advantage
of its lenient divorce laws. Interstate conflict put the issue on the political
agenda. But the states (working with the NCCUSL) failed to adopt a solution on their own, and after many years the courts were eventually forced to
step in.255
We’re not yet ready to venture a guess as to whether the courts have
struck the “right” balance—that is, whether they police too many spillovers
or too few. Our goal is to provide a framework for answering that question,
but there’s too much work left to be done to provide a definitive answer.
That’s precisely why we are so skeptical about the one-way ratchet approach
deployed by those who write in this field. They write as if the case for more
judicial intervention is obvious, and we hope that this Article at least undermines that assumption. It may, indeed, be a long while before anyone can
confidently answer this question. It’s been a hotly contested issue for decades in vertical federalism, and the debate in horizontal federalism has not
yet begun. You might think, for instance, that the courts have been too quick
to eliminate economic spillovers under the dormant Commerce Clause, or
that the courts ought not interfere with punitive-damages awards based on
out-of-state conduct. The work on these issues has been confined largely to
their doctrinal silos, and our point is that it ought to be reframed as part of
a larger debate about horizontal federalism’s safeguards.
***
Another question that remains underdeveloped is how the courts should
relate to the political institutions safeguarding horizontal federalism. But
even here, remarkably enough, we can discern the beginnings of a debate—
at least as it concerns Congress—in the extant work on the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.256 The case law and scholarship on this subject differ substantially from the work done in most of horizontal federalism’s other doctrinal
silos, and with good reason. The text is unusual in two respects, both highly
relevant to the subject of this Article.257 First, the clause can be read as a
255. For an astute analysis, see Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the
Constitution, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 381 (2007).
256. We are indebted to Danny Randolph for helping us explore these possibilities.
257. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by
general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be
proved, and the effect thereof.”).
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textual sanction of spillovers because it requires states to enforce the judgments of other states. Second, the clause invests Congress with decisionmaking authority in this area. While the meaning of both provisions is hotly
contested, at the very least the text runs against the grain by normalizing
spillovers and highlighting the role that political institutions can play in
resolving the conflict they engender.
It is thus unsurprising that the doctrine and scholarship that emerge
from the Full Faith and Credit Clause provide a rich set of resources for
thinking about the recurring puzzles in horizontal federalism. There are, to
be sure, scholars who subscribe to the same principles that dominate the
discourse on horizontal federalism: sovereignty, territoriality, and equality
among the states.258 But because the clause, in effect, mandates spillovers and
provides for a congressional role in regulating them, scholars have thought
more creatively about the possibilities associated with both. Some have depicted the clause as a driver of national unity that binds individual states
into a robust union.259 Others, like Rosen, have identified deep tensions
within the clause that, on Rosen’s view, “fus[es] the states into a single nation while keeping the states meaningfully empowered.”260 And still others,
258. E.g., Schmitt, supra note 52, at 489 (looking to “territorial-based jurisdictional principles” to cabin Congress’s power to give state laws extraterritorial effect and relying on the
courts to protect state sovereignty); see also Paige E. Chabora, Congress’ Power Under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 604, 647–48
(1997) (emphasizing equality and sovereignty); Laycock, supra note 7, at 250–51 (recognizing
territoriality and state equality as principles for defining the limits of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause).
259. See, e.g., Chabora, supra note 258, at 647 (noting the “unifying purpose of the
Clause”); Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1945) (noting that behind the “application of the clause is the federal
policy of a ‘more perfect union’ of our legal systems”); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage,
Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 Yale L.J. 1965, 2006
(1997) (“commitment to Union is itself a fundamental . . . value” undergirding the clause);
Rex Glensy, Note, The Extent of Congress’ Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 71 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 137, 152 (1997) (“Indeed, in the grand scheme, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
was ‘one of the principal assurances that the United States would have the unity of one nation
instead of being thirteen (or fifty) separate little nations.’ ” (citation omitted)). For the case
law, see, for example, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (depicting the
clause as a “nationally unifying force”); Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I), 317 U.S. 287,
303 (1942) (noting that the clause is designed to convert states “into an integrated whole”);
and Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935) (noting that the clause is
designed to ensure that states are “integral parts of a single nation”).
260. Rosen, supra note 221, at 12; see also Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act
Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors
That Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 915, 935 (2006). Interestingly, we see similar arguments emerging from the field of personal jurisdiction, another doctrinal silo that has wrestled with the shortcomings of sovereignty. See supra notes 248–253 and
accompanying text; Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 971, 1017
(2009) (“[P]liable jurisdictional limits . . . offer[ ] a way to cabin cultural disagreements, to
achieve interstate accommodation, and to fold federalist tension into a kind of (precarious)
national equipoise.”); Richard K. Greenstein, The Action Bias in American Law: Internet Jurisdiction and the Triumph of Zippo Dot Com, 80 Temp. L. Rev. 21, 48 (2007) (Personal jurisdiction has “generate[d] its own tension between states’ rights and national unity.”).
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like Professor Strasser, suggest that the “public-policy” exception represents
an effort to strike a balance between what we would describe as the competing principles of democratic self-rule and union:
Merely because the law of a foreign state differs from the law of a forum
state is not sufficient to justify the forum’s invocation of the public policy
exception. The Supreme Court has noted that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires states to submit to “hostile policies” of other states “because the practical operation of the federal system . . . demand[s] it.”261

Even the notion of sovereignty plays a complex role in these debates.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause places the question of regulatory overlap
squarely in front of us, and scholars disagree about whether forcing one state
to recognize another’s law vindicates or undermines sovereignty—whether
we should worry more about spillunders or spillovers.262 That’s precisely the
kind of debate we would expect once the field comes to grip with the reality
of spillovers. As we note above, it is a mistake to think that the only form of
state power that matters is a state’s ability to shield its citizens from out-ofstate policies. A state’s power also encompasses the ability to extend state
policies beyond its boundaries, as the debate over the recognition of samesex marriages by other states makes clear. Those who care about state power
should worry as much about spillunders as spillovers, and it’s interesting
that those who write about the Full Faith and Credit Clause have made so
much progress on this front.
261. Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Marriages,
and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 307, 321 (1998) (citation omitted).
262. Compare Glensy, supra note 259, at 153 (arguing that requiring states to grant full
faith and credit to another state’s law “valorize[s] state power” because it “prevents any one
state from insulating itself from the others”), with Rosen, supra note 260, at 935–37 (suggesting that the clause undermines the ability of a state to abide by its own preferred laws).
Sharkey spots a similar tension in the Court’s due-process and punitive-damages cases. See
Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive Damages in the Wake of
Phillip Morris v. Williams, 46 Willamette L. Rev. 449, 457 (2010). Sharkey writes that
“[v]indicating ‘state interests’ in this realm cuts in two separate directions.” Id. She then explains as follows:
On the one hand, each state maintains the prerogative to design and implement a punitive damages scheme in furtherance of its legitimate state interests. On the other hand,
federal intervention may be necessary to restrain a state from imposing punitive damages
that regulate beyond its borders, thereby trampling upon other states’ legitimate policy
aims.

Id. We see traces of this debate in horizontal federalism’s other doctrinal silos. See, e.g.,
Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 Geo. Mason
L. Rev. 1 (2004) (endorsing the sovereignty principle but finding that it is vindicated, not
undermined, by allowing states to take extraterritorial conduct into account when awarding
punitive damages); F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages
Awards: “Morals Without Technique?”, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 349, 389 (2008) (arguing that limits
imposed by the Supreme Court’s due-process and punitive-damages cases restrict the ability of
a state to “deter corporate misconduct within its borders” and thus “interfer[e] with a state’s
sovereignty”).
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Academics have also considered what limits the clause imposes on Congress’s ability to contract or expand the duties that states owe to one another,263 a discussion that tees up yet another crucial question in horizontal
federalism: How should the courts and Congress interact as they jointly police interstate relations?264 In answering this question, academics have argued
over whether a political institution like Congress is well suited for addressing
spillover problems. Some believe that the legislators are untrustworthy because they are “subject to plenty of short-term pressures to act badly or for
inappropriate reasons.”265 Others insist that the legislative process is well
suited to dealing with controversial choice-of-law problems because of its
“characteristic capacity for accommodation and political compromise and
its greater responsiveness to practical experience and changing needs.”266
Scholars of the Full Faith and Credit Clause have, in short, begun to do just
what we think scholars of horizontal federalism need to do more generally:
study the role that politics plays in policing interstate conflict.
Conclusion
We’ll conclude by redescribing what we believe to be the first step toward building a safeguards account. The extant literature on horizontal federalism looks much like the early writing on vertical federalism. It is
dominated by accounts of sovereignty and the importance of judicial review.
Scholars are largely united behind a single goal: to reduce spillovers and the
interstate friction that accompanies them. Little wonder, then, that the few
scholars to have even considered whether the political safeguards of horizontal federalism exist have dismissed them out of hand. The basic foundations
of a safeguards account are simply missing from the literature.
To build a robust and satisfying account of the political safeguards of
horizontal federalism, one must begin with a descriptive and normative account of why much interstate conflict can and should be left to the free play
of politics. We have attempted to offer that account here. We have explained
that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, spillovers—and the interstate
263. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 Yale L.J. 1584
(2009); Kramer, supra note 259; Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and
Public Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 33 (1957); Stephen E. Sachs,
Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1201 (2009); Ralph U. Whitten, The
Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32
Creighton L. Rev. 255 (1998); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State
Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1981); Charles M. Yablon,
Madison’s Full Faith and Credit Clause: A Historical Analysis, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 125 (2011);
Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Less Perfect Union, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1996, at E11, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/25/opinion/toward-a-less-perfect-union.html.
264. Interestingly, a few scholars have begun to raise a similar set of questions in the
context of personal jurisdiction. See Erbsen, supra note 7, at 75–89. See generally Sachs, supra
note 76.
265. Kramer, supra note 259, at 2006.
266. Engdahl, supra note 263, at 1592; see also Rosen, supra note 221, at 21–23.
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friction they generate—offer substantial democratic benefits. We have questioned the assumptions that have led most scholars in the field not only to
think that spillovers should be suppressed but to look to the judiciary for
assistance. We have sketched a basic argument to support the notion that,
despite the prevalence of spillovers, our system has proved to be reasonably
robust. And we have begun to map the institutions that play a role in maintaining the political safeguards of horizontal federalism. All of these arguments require further development and refinement; the scholars of vertical
federalism have spent decades on them, after all. This Article offers at least
an initial take.
While we have begun to lay the foundation for a safeguards account,
much work remains to complete it. We are plainly at the beginning of the
conversation, not the end, but surely it’s a conversation worth having.

